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Abstract
In a 2001 article (Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware Corporation Law) two of us, with important input from the other, argued that in
addressing issues like hostile takeovers, assertive institutional investors, leveraged buyouts, and
contested ballot questions, the Delaware courts had done exemplary work but on occasion
crafted standards of review that unduly encouraged litigation and did not appropriately credit
intra-corporate procedures designed to ensure fairness. Function Over Form suggested ways to
make those standards more predictable, encourage procedures that better protected
stockholders, and discourage meritless litigation, by restoring business judgment rule protection
for transactions approved by independent directors, the disinterested stockholders, or both.
This article examines how Delaware law responded to the prior article’s
recommendations, concluding that the Delaware judiciary has addressed most of them
constructively, thereby creating incentives to use procedures that promote the fair treatment of
stockholders and discourage meritless litigation. The continued excellence and diligence of the
Delaware judiciary is one of Delaware corporate law’s core strengths.
But some recent cases have articulated standards of review that involve greater than
optimal litigation intensity and less than ideal respect for decision-making in which independent
directors and disinterested stockholders have potent say. Those standards also impair the
integrity of Delaware’s approach to demand excusal in derivative cases and the identification of
controlling stockholders. We also propose eliminating concepts like substantive coercion that do
not provide a legitimate basis for resolving cases. Finally, we urge action to correct new
problems such as the unfair targeting of corporate officers for negligence claims in
representative actions and the frustrating state of practice under Delaware’s books and records
statute.
I.

Introduction
A generation ago, two of us, together with our late friend, Professor and former

Chancellor William T. Allen as co-author, and the third of us as a primary sounding board,
published Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware
Corporation Law.4 We were all deeply committed to the integrity, fairness, efficiency, and thus
effectiveness of Delaware corporate law. And we understood the challenge of helping to assure
that a corporation law dependent on judicial common law responded appropriately to new market
developments. In the main, the Delaware judiciary, supported by those who drafted and enacted
4

William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001) [hereinafter Function
Over Form].
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Delaware’s statutory corporate law, had done an exemplary job of addressing new phenomena
such as hostile takeovers, assertive institutional investors, management- and controller-led
leveraged buyouts, and contested ballot questions of various kinds.
We also recognized, however, that when courts charged with doing equity, often under
considerable time pressure, confront novel situations involving corporate action arguably tainted
by a conflict of interest to the detriment of the corporation and its stockholders, they may be
tempted to develop litigation-intensive standards of review specifically tailored to each emerging
situation.5 Such standards can cause systemic inefficiency. Incentivizing transactional planners to
use mechanisms that are both costly and risky, such as special committees or stockholder votes,
requires that those mechanisms meaningfully restrain judicial review.6 Review standards that
afford courts undue freedom to second-guess transactions, even after negotiation by a special
committee of independent directors or a fully informed vote by the disinterested stockholders,
discourage transactional planners from using those processes. Litigation costs rise unnecessarily,
when newly articulated standards of review increase the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to extract a
fee-generating settlement solely because the anticipated costs of discovery and litigating a case
that cannot be dismissed on the pleadings exceeds the cost of a settlement.
Function Over Form identified specific areas where these tendencies had crept into
Delaware law and eroded its effectiveness. To address them, we argued first that standards of
review must make functional sense, and we proposed criteria for defining such functionality.
Second, we proposed that Delaware’s equitable common law of corporations should function on
the basis of three standards of review: i) the business judgment rule, to govern decisions
approved by impartial decision makers and to address damages claims based on a lack of due
5
6

Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1297.
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care; ii) intermediate scrutiny, to address takeover defenses, corporate sales processes, and
potential ballot manipulation; and iii) the entire fairness standard, to address self-dealing
transactions that were not approved by impartial decisionmakers.7 We suggested ways to make
the application of these standards more predictable, to encourage decision-making procedures
that better protected stockholders from abuse, and to afford a less litigious path where the
challenged corporate decision was made by independent directors or approved by the
disinterested stockholders, or both.8
In particular, Function Over Form advocated rationalizing standards of review that
developed in response to the takeover and M&A boom of the 1980s and 1990s. At the outset of
that era, the courts had not yet developed a standard of review that adequately and flexibly
balanced the utility of applying business judgment rule deference to impartial decision-making
against the reality that takeover bids presented new forms of conflicts of interest. To achieve
that balance, the Delaware Supreme Court, in its foundational Unocal and Revlon decisions,
created an intermediate standard of review that was more stringent than business judgment rule
non-review yet less demanding and more flexible than entire fairness review.9
Function Over Form concluded that the Delaware courts’ responses to the rapidly
evolving market for corporate control, “viewed collectively and from a policy perspective, were
balanced and productive.”10 But even so, a period of such intense doctrinal innovation would
predictably leave the law more complex, less clear, and less than optimally fair and efficient.
“From a technical corporation law perspective … th[e] results were often rationalized in a

7

Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1293.
Id. at 1297.
9
E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Co., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985);
Unitrin, 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
10
Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1291.
8
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manner that gave inadequate guidance to lawyers whose task was to plan, and render
advice to clients about, transactions based upon these post-1985 judicial opinions.”11
To address this concern, Function Over Form examined how standards of review
should function consistently with fundamental principles of equity:12
Our thesis is that certain key Delaware decisions articulated and
applied standards of review without adequately taking into
account the policy purposes those standards were intended to
achieve. [N]ew standards of review proliferated when a smaller
number of functionally-thought-out standards would have
provided a more coherent analytical framework. [W]e suggest a
closer alignment between the standards of judicial review used
in Delaware corporate law and the underlying policies that that
body of law seeks to achieve.13
A core theme was that the Delaware Supreme Court’s efforts to link all the
emerging standards of review to the business judgment rule had created a complex and
ambiguous framework for standards of review that was clunky and unpredictable. The
article therefore proposed “mid-course corrections” to simplify these standards of review
and make them more functional.14 Specifically:
To be functional, a standard of review should:
(i)

provide judges with a practical and logical framework
to determine whether corporate directors have
fulfilled their duties in a particular context and the
appropriate remedies if they have not;

(ii)

avoid needless complexity that creates opportunities for
inefficient processing of cases that have little likelihood of
ultimate success; and

11

Id. at 1291-92 n. 11 (citing, for example, confusion caused by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) articulating what triggered
duties under Revlon).
12
A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 664 n.54
(Del. Ch. 2007).
13
Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1292.
14
Id. at 1295, 1309.
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(iii)

be aligned with the public policies that animate the
corporate law by providing incentives for directors to act in
a manner most likely to advance corporate and stockholder
interests, and by deferring to outcomes reached through
effective intra-corporate dispute resolution mechanisms.

To us, a reliable test of whether a standard of review is truly
functional is utilitarian: is the standard a useful tool that aids
the court in deciding the fiduciary duty issue? … Put another
way, the truly functional standard of review is the test actually
used by the judge to reach a decision, not the ritualistic verbal
standard that in truth functions only as a conclusory statement
of the case’s outcome. 15
The bottom line recommendation was that Delaware courts should apply the three core
standards of review in a manner functionally consistent with those principles. Where a specific
standard applied, the court should apply it on a standalone basis, and not attempt to link it to
other standards in an effort to fabricate a kind of unified field theory.16
In this article, we examine how Delaware corporate law has responded to the prior
article’s recommendations. We conclude that in general, the Delaware judiciary has addressed
most of the original article’s concerns consistent with those recommendations. More
specifically, the Delaware courts successfully clarified (and in some instances reshaped) review
standards so as to create incentives for transactional planners and corporate boards to use
decision making processes that promote the fair treatment of stockholders, and discourage
meritless litigation.
Nevertheless, there are several areas where the concerns expressed in Function Over
Form have persisted or acquired renewed resonance. The case law of the new century has
generated certain standards of review and other doctrinal approaches that create excessive

15
16

Id. at 1297-98 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Id. at 1298; see also id. at 1309-11, 1319.

-5-

litigation intensity and suboptimal respect for intra-corporate decision-making processes in
which independent directors and disinterested stockholders have potent say. Those areas of
renewed concern – all but the last two of which implicate articulation of standards of review –
are addressed below. Those problematic areas are summarized below, along with the remedies
we propose:
a.

Extending the inherent coercion theory expressed in Kahn v. Lynch17 beyond

freezeout mergers to all controller transactions, thereby (i) making the procedural requirements
specified in MFW18 applicable to decisions for which they were not designed and do not
rationally pertain, and (ii) inappropriately expanding the range of full discovery and judicial
review for fairness. We advocate abandoning Lynch‘s inherent coercion rationale and limiting
the reach of MFW to transactions in which a controlling stockholder seeks to acquire the
minority’s shares, or a statute requires the approval of both the board and the stockholders.
b.

Enlarging the definition of “controlling stockholders” to include persons having

little or no share voting power, and to lump together unaffiliated stockholders into a “control
bloc,” so that a different standard of review applies, thereby expanding the range of full
discovery and judicial review for fairness. To address this concern, we propose limiting the
concept of “controlling stockholder” to the situation where a stockholder’s voting power gives it
at least negative power over the company’s future, in the sense of acting as a practical
impediment to any change of control.
c.

Insufficiently distinguishing between transactions involving classic self-dealing

and transactions in which a fiduciary (whether a director or controlling stockholder) receives an

17

Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) (“Kahn v. Lynch,” or “Lynch”).
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 67 A.3d 496, 528 (Del. Ch. 2013) (outlining procedures that if used in
a going private merger proposed by a controlling stockholder invoke the business judgment standard of
review), aff’d, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
18
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additional benefit only because of being differently situated, thereby extending entire fairness
review to a context where it does not fit. We advocate restoring that distinction, at the injunctive
stage, by applying Unocal and Revlon intermediate judicial review to transactions where a
fiduciary merely receives (but does not force) a benefit, such as a post-merger compensation
package, not received by other stockholders. In a post-closing damages case, the review standard
should require the plaintiff to prove a breach of the duty of loyalty and resulting damages.
d.

Circumscribing the reach of the second prong of Aronson,19 by prescribing

dismissal of a well-pleaded loyalty claim unless a majority of the directors face likely liability on
a non-exculpated claim. We advocate reinvigorating Aronson’s second prong “safety valve” to
allow demand excusal if the particularized facts support an inference that a breach of fiduciary
duty has harmed the company. Alternatively, if that is not the case, and Delaware law presumes
that independent directors who approved a transaction alleged to involve unfair self-dealing can
turn around and impartially sue their interested colleague on the board over that same transaction
after the fact, then logically it should also presume they can perform the easier and less dramatic
upfront function of effectively negotiating a fair transaction or saying no if fair terms are not
reached. Otherwise, Delaware law will rest on incoherent premises about independent directors.
e.

Maintaining doctrinal complications like “substantive coercion” and the “waste”

vestige of business judgment review. that obscure proper application of standards of review and
frustrate the principles that should drive case outcomes. We advocate (i) eradicating the concept
of “substantive coercion” as a basis for board authority to block a non-coercive bid, and relying
instead simply on the board’s ordinary authority; ii) interring the vestigial “corporate waste”

19

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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claim where the disinterested stockholders approve the challenged transaction; and (iii)
overruling Cede II’s20 and Unitrin’s21 effort to link together all three core standards of review.
f.

Enabling the plaintiffs’ bar to exploit the omission of coverage of corporate

officers under § 102(b)(7), and avoid dismissal by singling out officers as defendants, where the
challenged decisions are made by a majority independent board. To remedy this exploitation, we
propose that § 102(b)(7) be amended to permit exculpation of officers for duty of care claims in
class or derivative actions, but not for claims brought by the company to enforce a contract or
corporate common law.
g.

Expanding the scope of what constitutes “books and records” under § 220,22

thereby enabling stockholder plaintiffs to prospect for a claim challenging a merger that requires
stockholder approval. That in turn encourages defendants to interpose delaying tactics and
objections that frustrate the intended summary character of these statutory proceedings. To
address these problems, we recommend amending § 220 to provide that where a public company
stockholder vote is held on a merger, “books and records” should be limited to the equivalent of
SEC Rule 13e-323 materials within the company’s control.
II.

A Roadmap of the Article
In what follows, Section III traces how Delaware corporate law responded to the major

concerns identified Function Over Form. Section IV addresses areas where the original article’s
concerns have either persisted or re-emerged, largely because of the inescapably difficult
judgments that Delaware’s excellent corporate law judges must make, in real time and on
imperfect records. Section IV also elaborates on the ameliorating policy changes previewed

20

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (“Cede II”).
Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
22
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010).
23
17 CFR § 240.13e-3(d) and 240.13e-100 (Schedule 13E-3).
21
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above. We submit that these measured but important recalibrations will enhance the ability of
Delaware corporate law to fairly balance efficiency and fairness, reduce rent-seeking in the
litigation process, provide meaningful incentives for faithful fiduciary conduct, and remain true
to the business judgment rule tradition without detracting from the ability of Delaware courts to
remedy genuine inequities.
III.

Twenty Years of Doctrinal Evolution
A.

The Duty of Care: Towards Doctrinal Clarity

The opportunity to enforce a duty of care tempts law-trained judges to consider imposing
monetary liability on directors and managers who make business judgments in real time, by
superimposing judicial views of appropriate business tactics with the benefit of hindsight. The
business judgment rule exists to keep that temptation at bay. Consistent with that concern,
Function Over Form questioned the Supreme Court’s attempt in Cede II24 to turn a conventional
inquiry into whether a due care violation had occurred into a tour through multiple unrelated
standards of review. The article criticized that ruling on several grounds: first, the basic rationale
for entire fairness review—the difficulty of ascertaining, in non-arm’s length transactions, the
price at which a deal would have been effected—is alien to due care analysis; second, in cases
not involving a specific transaction, an entire fairness analysis is of little or no utility; third, Cede
II’s unprecedented standard-changing and burden-shifting treatment of the duty of care was
procedurally unfair to directors, and would diminish their incentive to engage in risky wealthcreating transactions that, as a policy matter, boards should be encouraged to undertake; and
fourth, that treatment conflicted with the policy for § 102(b)(7) provisions exculpating directors
for duty of care damages claims without any showing of entire fairness, by seeming to require

24

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
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directors affirmatively to establish entire fairness to earn their statutory entitlement to
exculpation.25 This attempt to unify disparate standards of review that address quite distinct
circumstances and concerns was confusing. Function Over Form advocated a straightforward
approach to due care damages cases: the plaintiff should have to prove a due care breach and
resulting damages.26
The article also questioned decisions treating the existence of an exculpatory charter
provision as a factual matter that could not be considered at the motion to dismiss stage. Thus,
one case suggested that a director who would be exculpated from liability for a due care breach
had to remain a defendant in a case challenging an interested transaction, even if the complaint
pled no facts inferentially establishing a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary duty.27 This
procedural oddity conflicted with other decisions, undermined the intended purpose of §
102(b)(7), raised litigation costs, and added needless complexity.
The Supreme Court has eliminated this ambiguity and oddity, by taking the side of those
cases that had ruled that an exculpatory charter provision must be considered on a motion to
dismiss.28 If the complaint does not plead facts that rationally support a loyalty claim, it should
be dismissed. Thus, the intended function of § 102(b)(7) is now better served.
The concern about Cede II’s due care/entire fairness linkage persists, however: the
Delaware Supreme Court has yet to disavow that linkage explicitly, even though no Delaware

25

Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1304-05.
Id.
27
E.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d. 1215 (Del. 1999).
28
See In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1185-86 (Del. 2015). For
cases before Cornerstone embracing a similar view of § 102(b)(7), see McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d
1262, 1274-75 (Del. Ch. 2008); DiRenzo v. Lichtenstein, C.A. No. 7094-VCP, 2013 WL 5503034, at
*34-38 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2013); In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761
(Del. Ch. 2011); Raul v. Astoria Fin. Corp., C.A. No. 9169-VCG, 2014 WL 2795312, at *10 (Del. Ch.
June 20, 2014).
26
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court has since cited that aspect of Cede II approvingly. We view this silence as an implicit
recognition that the Cede II linkage was dysfunctional, but hope that it will be given an overdue
formal interment.
B.

Dispatching the “Triad:” Restoring Good Faith as a Fundamental Requirement
of a Loyal Fiduciary

Function Over Form noted another problem arising out of Cede II, namely its
pronouncement that in addition to the two core fiduciary duties — loyalty and care29 — there
was a third duty, that of “good faith.” This additional duty, creating what was described as a
“triad,”30 made little sense.31 As Function Over Form noted:
Although corporate directors are unquestionably obligated to
act in good faith, doctrinally that obligation does not exist
separate and apart from the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Rather,
it is a subset or “subsidiary requirement” … subsumed within
the duty of loyalty….32
Later case law, culminating in Stone v. Ritter,33 has put the “triad” to rest. This
clarified our law and aligned basic fiduciary doctrine with Caremark, which premises
director liability on a failure to make a good faith effort to monitor the company’s
compliance with law.34
C.

Unocal Review Should Stand on its Own

29

The duty of loyalty is paramount and the duty to try to exercise reasonable care is itself a requirement
of the duty of loyalty. A good faith effort to act prudently in making business decisions is required by the
obligation of loyalty. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019) (“In short, to satisfy their
duty of loyalty, directors must make a good faith effort to implement an oversight system and then
monitor it.) See also Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City v. Presidio, Inc., 251 A.3d 212,
251, 253 (Del. Ch. 2021) (discussing the duty of loyalty and “its subsidiary element of good faith”).
30
Cede II, 634 A.2d at 361 (citations omitted).
31
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti, and Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2009).
32
Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1305 n.69.
33
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003).
34
In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Consistent with its focus on functionality, Function Over Form urged that the three
basic standards of review operate independently: where a standard applies, the court’s
employment of that standard should be case-dispositive, and not invite an unnecessary detour
into a different, unrelated standard of review. Function Over Form therefore urged that the
attempt to link Unocal review (of the reasonableness of a target company board’s defensive
measure) to the entire fairness and business judgment standards of review served no useful
function.35 According to both Unocal and Unitrin,36 however, finding a defensive measure
reasonable (or not) under the Unocal standard would not end the inquiry. Rather, (i) if the
board satisfies Unocal, its defensive actions would be subjected to a second layer of review
under the business judgment standard, and (ii) if the board’s actions fail Unocal, the
defensive measures could still survive judicial scrutiny if the board can demonstrate that its
actions were entirely fair. 37 But, it made no analytical sense to suppose that a board that
passed the more stringent reasonableness test would fail the less demanding business
judgment standard. Nor did it make sense to suppose that a board found to have acted
unreasonably could nonetheless satisfy the more exacting entire fairness standard.
Perhaps recognizing that illogic, courts have made little use of Unitrin’s attempt to
link Unocal and the business judgment and entire fairness standards. Rather, the Delaware
courts have applied Unocal, and its sister Revlon, as free-standing standards of review.38

35

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
37
See id. at 1377 n.18, 1390; see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
38
Accordingly, the cases now recognize that neither Unocal nor Revlon provides a framework for
analyzing claims for monetary damages. E.g., In re Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 115 A.3d 1173, 1176
(Del. 2015) (a plaintiff seeking damages must plead non-exculpated claims against a director protected
by a exculpatory charter provision regardless of the underlying standard of review); Corwin v. KKR Fin.
Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015) (“Unocal and Revlon are primarily designed to give
stockholders and the Court of Chancery the tool of injunctive relief to address important M & A decisions
in real time, before closing. They were not tools designed with post-closing money damages claims in
36
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D.

Securing the Ballot Box’s Integrity Under the Intermediate Standard of Review

The goal of simplifying standards of review into a tri-partite functional framework
requires making policy choices. One such choice made in Function Over Form concerned using
Blasius’s “compelling justification” standard as a functional standard of review.39 That article –
co-authored by the judge who authored Blasius – acknowledged that because of the broad
authority entrusted to boards of directors, the legitimacy of Delaware corporate law would be
suspect if it did not police ballot manipulation strictly, and applauded Blasius as an iconic
reaffirmation of the principle that stockholders have a right to elect directors without electoral
manipulation by management.
Even so, Blasius functioned not as a standard of review but as a label for a result, because
the trigger that invoked the test was whether there was an intentional effort to disenfranchise the
stockholders. Few if any cases, however, involve action so patently ham-handed; in most
electoral cases there are plausible reasons, unrelated to blocking a free exercise of stockholder
will, for the challenged action. The court’s task, then, is to determine whether that action was
legitimate, or merely a pretext to thwart a fair exercise of voting rights. Function Over Form
urged that Blasius be eliminated as a standalone standard of review, and that its concerns be
addressed by applying Unocal and requiring the board to identify a threat that justified their
action and demonstrate that it was reasonable in light of that threat. That position did not
condone board action designed to disenfranchise stockholders or tilt an election unfairly; it
merely asserted that the Unocal test would be more effective in identifying such behavior,

mind . . . .”); McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“ that a corporate board
has decided to engage in a change of control transaction invoking so-called Revlon duties does not change
the showing of culpability a plaintiff must make … to hold the directors liable for monetary damages”).
39
Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1311 (discussing Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d
651, 659 (Del. 1988)).

-13-

because boards never confess to acting in bad faith.40 That two-part test gave the Court of
Chancery a sound basis to smoke out pretext and determine whether action was unfairly
preclusive, while permitting flexibility in the timing and conduct of voting in corporate elections
and on transactions in a manner that serves the interests of stockholders.
The post-2001 case law developed in this direction: in Liquid Audio,41 the Supreme Court
essentially incorporated Blasius’s and Schnell’s spirit into the Unocal test. Applying that
approach in cases involving debt provisions that impeded proxy contests by operating like a
poison pill if an insurgent slate were elected, the Court of Chancery has vindicated the right of
stockholders to run a proxy contest free of such impediments.42 And a more recent decision
adopting that approach invalidated an aggressive poison pill triggered at a level intended to be so
low as to eliminate any economic incentive to engage in ballot-box activism.43 According to the
court’s reading of the testimony, the board’s rationale was that allowing any stockholder vote
during the pandemic would be adverse to the company’s best interests and stockholders might

40

Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1311. See also Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, 68 A.3d 242, 25859 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“By enabling the Court of Chancery to examine whether the directors taking actions
have acted in a circumstantially reasonable way, the Supreme Court provided a responsible form of
review that smokes out self-interest and pretext, by requiring boards that face the omnipresent specter of
Unocal to justify their actions as reasonable in relationship to a threat faced by the corporation. This
Court has followed the Delaware Supreme Court and applied Unocal in these situations with a special
sensitivity towards the stockholder franchise.”).
41
MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1129 (Del.2003) (“Both standards [Unocal and
Blasius] recognize the inherent conflicts of interest that arise when a board of directors acts to prevent
shareholders from effectively exercising their right to vote either contrary to the will of the incumbent
board members generally or to replace the incumbent board members in a contested election.”); see also
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del.1992) (incorporating Blasius within Unocal).
42
San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 315 (Del. Ch. 2009);
Sandridge Energy, 68 A.3d 242, 258-59 (Del. Ch. 2013). But, when the board legitimately acted to move
a vote to allow stockholders to consider new material information, Chancery found no violation. E.g.,
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007). (In the interest of brevity, but with
no disrespect intended, we occasionally refer to the Court of Chancery as “Chancery,” a moniker common
among members of the court itself).
43
In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., Consolidated C.A. No. 2020-0707-KSJM, 2021 WL 754593 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 26, 2021).
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hurt the company by electing new directors or changing corporate policy during this delicate
time. Rejecting that rationale, Vice-Chancellor, now Chancellor, McCormick stated:
Viewing all stockholder activism as a threat is an extreme
manifestation of the proscribed we-know-better justification for
interfering with the franchise. That is, categorically concluding
that all stockholder efforts to change or influence corporate
direction constitute a threat to the corporation runs directly
contrary to the ideological underpinnings of Delaware law. The
broad category of conduct referred to as stockholder activism,
therefore, cannot constitute a cognizable threat under the first
prong of Unocal.44
Citing Blasius’s rejection of the idea that a board may protect stockholders from themselves by
cutting off their ability to act at the ballot box, the court enjoined the pill under Unocal.45
As advocated two decades ago in Function Over Form, we applaud this use of Unocal. It
provides a functional way for courts to expose and invalidate pretextual behavior even where a
subjective inequitable purpose cannot be clearly established. That said, and as stated in Function
Over Form: “our recommendation that voting issues be reviewed under Unocal rests on the
assumption that courts will apply that test with rigor and that the doctrine of Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., retains vitality.”46
E.

Restoring Foundational Principles by Cabining Kahn v. Lynch’s Inherent
Coercion Doctrine

44

Williams, 2021 WL 754593, at *30.
Id. at *22 n.251 (citing and quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662) (“[W]hen viewed from a broad,
institutional perspective, it can be seen that matters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting
process involve consideration not present in any other context in which directors exercise delegated
power.”); see also Mercier, 929 A.2d at 811 (“The notion that directors know better than stockholders
about who should be on the board is no justification at all.”). Cf. Coster v. UIP Cos., Inc., 255 A.3d 952,
963-64 (holding that a dilutive stock issuance was a breach of fiduciary duty because it stripped the
plaintiff of the ability to exert negative control via continued deadlock, but not applying the integrated
Unocal approach because the plaintiff framed its challenge solely under Schnell and Blasius).
46
Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1316 n.111.
45
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Function Over Form also questioned the intrusive standard of review articulated in
Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.47 That decision upheld the view that neither
approval by a special committee of disinterested directors nor approval by an informed
“majority of the minority” stockholder vote would change the standard of review, and that
entire fairness would remain the standard of review, but the burden would shift to the plaintiff
to prove that the transaction was unfair.48 The rationale was that a controlling stockholder
that wished to take a company private had such retributive powers that both independent
directors and stockholders would be subject to a form of inherent coercion, and could not
exercise the free will to say no.
In so ruling, the court, surely unintentionally, created a disincentive to seek an approving
“majority of the minority” stockholder vote, because the acquired company’s board could obtain
the same protection by using a lower cost, less risky “special committee” process as a
“cleansing” mechanism. Although Lynch did not explicitly say so, the decision implied that
even if both a special committee and a majority of the minority stockholder vote were
required, the most that a controller could gain was the same burden shift as if it used only one
of those cleansing mechanisms.49
Function Over Form urged that Lynch be re-thought, for several reasons. The inherent
coercion theory could not be squared with market realities, which demonstrated both the vigor

47

Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.
49
Id. Curiously, the threat supposedly presented by the controller in Lynch was the prospect of bypassing
the board and making a tender offer directly to the public stockholders. This threat would have been
hollow, however, had the Supreme Court held going private tender offers to a standard of equitable
fairness equivalent to that applicable to mergers. But the doctrine was different: the controller had no
such duty of fairness. Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns, Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (1996); Lynch v. Vickers, 383
A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). This doctrinal inconsistency informed Lynch’s embrace of a rigid standard of
review and the inherent coercion rationale.
48
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and ability of stockholders to oppose transactions they considered inadequate, and the
effectiveness of properly advised independent directors when acting as a bargaining agent to
extract a robust price from a controller. And Delaware law itself was much more potent in
policing retribution than Lynch gave it credit for.50
Function Over Form therefore advocated that the inherent coercion rationale of Lynch
should be cabined:
The better policy… is to afford business judgment review
treatment to self-interested mergers that are approved by
either an effective independent director committee or by a
majority of the minority stockholder vote…
. . In today’s environment there is insufficient justification for
giving less than full cleansing effect to a self-interested merger
that is conditioned on approval of a majority of the minority
stockholders. That is especially true now that disclosure
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
efforts of the private plaintiffs’ bar are being augmented by the
increased activism of institutional investors, and being
facilitated by the enormous information flow made possible by
new technology . . . [W]e propose that the more sound
approach would be for the courts to defer to the business
decision reached in good faith by the elected independent
directors of the corporation. At the very least, the burdenshifting rule of Lynch Communication should be altered in the case
of self-interested mergers that are conditioned expressly on
majority of the minority shareholder approval.51
This recommendation rested on another fundamental premise: that where a
controlling stockholder or other interested party proposes a self-dealing transaction that
does not involve a going private merger, the entire fairness standard presumptively

50

Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1308-09 (“Delaware case law is replete with cases where
majority stockholders have been held legally accountable for abusing the minority. There is no
empirical basis for courts to presume conclusively—as our current rule does—that the threat of
liability [if a controller took retributive action] would not, in most cases, check majority stockholder
misconduct . . . .”).
51
Id. at 1309 & 1306-07.
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applies, but if any of the traditional cleansing protections are employed to approve the
transaction – i.e., i) approval by a board comprised of a majority of independent
directors; ii) approval by a special committee of independent directors; or iii) approval by
a majority of the disinterested stockholders – the business judgment rule standard should
apply. 52 In particular, approval by disinterested stockholders was a well-understood basis
for invocation of the business judgment rule, 53 a position thoroughly documented in the
Delaware Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Corwin. 54

52

In an excellent article, Vice Chancellor Laster put it this way:
If a board of directors lacks an independent and disinterested majority, then the standard
of review will de-escalate from entire fairness if the board exercised its authority under §
141(c) to empower a committee of independent and disinterested directors to make the
relevant decision.
If the board delegates its full power to address an issue to a committee, then the judicial
search for a qualified decision maker shifts from the board to the committee. The same
principles that govern the inquiry at the board level apply at the committee level, and the
court will determine whether there were sufficient directors who voted in favor of the
decision to make up a disinterested, independent, and informed majority of the
committee. So long as the board has not retained some residual approval right or
otherwise limited the committee’s authority, in which case the board’s retention of a
portion of its authority undermines the committee’s ability to decide the issue and keeps
the judicial focus on the board, then a decision made by a disinterested, independent, and
informed majority of the committee receives business judgment deference.

J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1443, 1444 (2014) (citations omitted).
The article refers to the traditional cleansing protections, but aptly calls them “qualified decision makers,”
as a shorthand for an “independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed decision maker.” Id.
53
See Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1317-18 (“Under present Delaware law, a fully informed
majority vote of the disinterested stockholders that approves a transaction (other than a merger with a
controlling stockholder) has the effect of insulating the directors from all claims except waste.”). For
cases taking this view, see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889-90 (Del. 1985); In re Wheelabrator
Techs, Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d
720, 736–38 (Del. Ch. 1999).
54
Corwin, 125 A.3d at 310 n.19 (gathering precedents dating back to 1928 supporting this position). For
an excellent historical discussion of this issue including the nuances of ratification, see Laster, supra note
52 (discussing a long line of Delaware cases reflecting that an informed vote of disinterested stockholders
invoked the business judgment standard of review).
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Even in the context of even a going private merger, Function Over Form did not
embrace inherent coercion, and it certainly did not embrace that concept in any other
context. 55 Nor did it embrace having one set of equitable rules for controlling
stockholders and another for other interested parties. Function Over Form did not
advocate that Lynch be applied to all controller transactions, especially ones that did not
involve statutorily required vote; to the contrary, the thrust of the article was to confine
Lynch, not extend it.
Although the path was long (about twenty years) and not entirely straight, Delaware law
did evolve in the direction advocated in Function Over Form, culminating (almost fully) in the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. in 2014.56 The path was
bumpy, however, in several respects. First, because Lynch gave no credit for using both a special
committee followed by a majority of the minority vote,57 that cleansing structure was not used,
thereby depriving stockholders of the optimal set of protections. Second, because defendants
were unable to dismiss cases seemingly inexorably subject to an entire fairness standard,
plaintiffs’ lawyers obtained fees by filing suit immediately upon announcement of a going
private merger proposal, and thereafter settling as soon as the special committee negotiated for a
higher price than the controller initially offered.58 Evidence indicated that any benefit for

55

See generally, Function Over Form, supra note 4.
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). For a history of the treatment of freezeouts
after Lynch, see In re Pure Res. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 433-41 (Del. Ch. 2002); In re Cox
Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614-24 (Del. Ch. 2005); M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d
at 642-44.
57
Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.
58
In a recorded video interview, Kevin Abrams, counsel for Cox Communications, provides a vivid, inperson account of this phenomenon. Interview of Kevin Abrams and Stephen Jenkins, available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/8633-in-re-cox-comms-inc-shareholder-litigation-879-a2d.
56
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stockholders derived from the efforts of the special committees, not plaintiffs’ lawyers, who
were often willing to settle for less than what the committee was able to achieve.59
Third, Delaware law was incoherent. If a controller proposed to effect a going private
tender offer, it could do so without any duty of fairness so long as it disclosed the material facts
and did not coerce the stockholders.60 In fact, it was this differential treatment in the law that
enabled the controller in Lynch to credibly threaten that it could bypass rejection by the special
committee and still avoid entire fairness review. This potential influenced the adoption of the
inherent coercion approach in Lynch, because it seemed to leave the special committee with what
the Court believed to be inadequate protective clout. But, instead of using the case to subject
going private tender offers to fairness review and thereby prevent the controller from escaping
fairness review by bypassing the committee, Lynch deepened this incoherent treatment by
subjecting a controller to unavoidable discovery costs and fairness review when it took the more
stockholder-protective route by seeking cleansing via a minority stockholder vote, and seemingly
even where it used a combination of two traditional cleansing protections - special committee
approval and a minority of the majority vote - in tandem.61
Post-Lynch cases and scholarly articles exposed and criticized this incoherent scheme of
transactional review.62 In Pure63 and Cox,64 the Court of Chancery suggested that all controlling

59

In an important article, scholars proved the poor cost-to-benefit ratio of this kabuki litigation, and the
Court of Chancery noted this unseemly reality. Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then
Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797 (2004);
Cox, 879 A.2d at 629-30.
60
Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39-40; Lynch v. Vickers, 383 A.2d 278, 279-81 (Del. 1977).
61
Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.
62
For some of the scholarly articles, see Weiss & White, supra note 59, Guhan Subramanian, PostSiliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory, Evidence & Policy, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 800-03 (2003).
63
In re Pure Res. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
64
In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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stockholder going private transactions be treated comparably, and that even in this starkly zerosum context, the business judgment standard should be applied if either a going private merger or
a tender offer were made subject to approval by both a special committee of independent
directors and a majority of the minority from the inception of the bid and offer process.65 That
approach would be coherent regardless of transactional form, and would address Lynch’s bypass
concern.
Not until 2011, however, did a controller take the chance of employing both cleansing
protections in combination in an effort to invoke business judgment rule protection. That enabled
the Delaware courts to have a chance to consider, for the first time, the continuing viability of
Kahn v. Lynch’s inherent coercion doctrine.
In MFW, MacAndrews & Forbes, M&F Worldwide’s 43% stockholder, acquired M&F
Worldwide’s remaining shares in a cash merger. Under the procedure adopted, “upfront,
MacAndrews & Forbes said it would not proceed with any going private transaction that was not
approved: (i) by an independent special committee; and (ii) by a vote of a majority of the
stockholders unaffiliated with the controlling stockholder . . . .”66 Granting summary judgment,
the court held that “when a controlling stockholder merger has, from the time of the controller’s
first overture, been subject to (i) negotiation and approval by a special committee of independent
directors fully empowered to say no, and (ii) approval by an uncoerced, fully informed vote of a
majority of the minority investors, the business judgment standard of review applies.”67

65

See Pure, 808 A.2d at 434-35, 443-44; Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 623-24; In re MFW Worldwide, 67 A.3d
at 525 & n.144. See also In re Cysive, Inc. S’holder Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 549-51 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re
JCC Holding Co., Inc., 843 A.2d 713, 723 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re PNB Co S’holders Litig., Consolidated
C.A. No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *14 n. 69.
66
In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 499 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. M&F Worldwide Corp.,
88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
67
Id. at 502.

-21-

The Court of Chancery decision also explained why the inherent coercion rationale of
Lynch gave too little weight to current market realities, to experience with special committees
and stockholder votes, and to the ability of the Delaware courts to police retribution.68 Adopting
the trial court’s reasoning, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed,69 and the viability of a motion
to dismiss a complaint challenging a controller freezeout merger is now established in Delaware
law, as Function Over Form advocated, where an informed and uncoerced special committee and
the minority stockholders approve it.
IV.

21st Century Doctrinal Developments that Warrant Doctrinal or Legislative Change
In this section we identify concerns that Delaware law may have again created

unnecessary complexity and potential for systemic unfairness, and propose solutions to make
Delaware law more functional and predictable.
A.

The Continued and Expanded Life of Lynch’s Inherent Coercion Theory, and Its
Negative Consequences

As described earlier,70 MFW reined in Lynch’s “inherent coercion” rationale, and the
mischief it caused in connection with going private mergers.71 The Supreme Court’s affirming
decision in that case, and its later decision in Flood v. Synutra International, Inc.72 essentially
rejected the inherent coercion theory, and restored traditional principles for determining the
68

Id. at 503.
M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635. In a controversial footnote, the Court mused in dictum that the
complaint would have survived a motion to dismiss, on the theory that allegations challenging the fairness
of the price also thereby “call into question the adequacy of the Special Committee’s negotiations.” Id. at
645 n. 14. That was a seriously discordant note: if use of the procedure sanctioned in MFW did not yield
business judgment rule deference and concomitant dismissal on the pleadings, its newly adopted doctrine
would do little or nothing to incentivize controlling stockholders to adopt the approach taken by the
controller in that case. In 2018, the Supreme Court put the footnote to rest, stating that “to the extent that
note 14 is inconsistent with this decision, Swomley [v. Schlecht, 128 A.3d 992 (Del. 2015)], or the Court
of Chancery’s opinion in MFW, it is hereby overruled.” Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754, 766
n.81 (Del. 2018).
70
See Part III(F) above.
71
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
72
195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018).
69
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standard of judicial review applicable to conflict transactions. It did so by recognizing that (i)
independent directors and stockholders can exercise real leverage and make informed choices
when faced with a conflict transaction involving a controller,73 and (ii) Delaware law is vibrant
enough to protect minority stockholders from retribution by a controller that did not get its
way.74
At the same time, MFW and its progenitors viewed going private mergers as a context in
which the dangers of overreaching are particularly grave, and therefore developed a bespoke
solution that could invoke the business judgment rule.75 We did not view those decisions as
imposing that solution on all controlling stockholder conflict transactions, but as instead
normalizing the approach Delaware law would take to controller transactions and to treat them
equally with other conflict transactions, at the very least where what was at issue was not a
transaction or decision that required both the approval of the board and the approval of
stockholders under the DGCL.76
But the common law evolves on a case by case basis, and precedent is sometimes
applied, in good faith, in a manner that the decisions did not intend or contemplate. That is what

73

The Supreme Court subtly distanced itself from the inherent coercion theory, notably by block-quoting
with approval two paragraphs from the Court of Chancery’s decision expressing the view that
independent directors and minority stockholders are capable of expressing and acting on a view different
than the controlling stockholder’s. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 643-44 (citing In re MFW
S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528 (Del. Ch. 2013)).
74
M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 643-44; Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754, 762-63 (Del.
2018).
75
MFW, 67 A.3d at 500 (“The approval of a special committee in a going private transaction is akin to
that of the approval of the board in a third-party transaction, and the approval of the noncontrolling
stockholders replicates the approval of all the stockholders.”); Cox, 879 A.2d at 606; Pure Resources, 808
A.2d at 444 n.43.
76
The decisions that led to the ultimate Supreme Court decisions in MFW and Flood took that position.
See Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 434-35, 443-44; Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 623-24; In re MFW Worldwide,
67 A.3d at 525 & n.144. So did Cysive, 836 A.2d at 549-51; In re JCC Holding Co., Inc., 843 A.2d 713,
723 (Del. Ch. 2003); and In re PNB Co. S’holders Litig., Consolidated C.A. No. 28-N, 2006 WL
2403999, at *14 n.69 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006).
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seems to have happened in the wake of MFW, leading to a phenomenon we describe occasionally
as “MFW creep.” Rather than confining MFW to the going private merger context for which that
case was specifically designed, plaintiffs have successfully urged Chancery in several cases to
require the full MFW suite of protections for any conflict transaction with a controlling
stockholder, in order to invoke business judgment review, even where no statutory vote is
required. The decisions that take this view are grounded not in reasoning in the cases leading up
to MFW, but in Lynch’s inherent coercion logic, which those cases cast doubt upon, and which
MFW and Flood implicitly abandoned. Admittedly, the decisions culminating in MFW
necessarily referred to the inherent coercion doctrine in a way that was respectful, but in our
view, clearly indicating that the doctrine was not convincing. But, instead of reading MFW as a
move away from the inherent coercion doctrine toward the traditional approach, the recent
Chancery cases have instead taken the view that inherent coercion exists in any situation where a
controller has a conflict.77

77

Decisions of this kind include: Berteau v. Glazek, C.A. No. 2020-873-PAF, 2021 Del. Ch. LEXIS 141
(Del. Ch. June 30, 2021); In re Tilray, Inc. Reorganization. Litig., C.A. No. 2020-0137-KSM, 2021 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 111, at *31 (Del. Ch. June 1, 2021). Interestingly, these opinions cite a statement by
Chancellor Allen to justify the extension of MFW to all controller transactions: in Kahn v. Tremont, he
wrote that “[d]efendants seek to limit Lynch to cases in which mergers give rise to the claim of unfairness,
but offer no plausible rationale for a distinction between mergers and other corporate transactions and in
principle I can perceive none.” Kahn v. Tremont Corp., C.A. No. 12339, 1996 WL 145452, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 21, 1996), rev’d, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997), remanded to C.A. No. 12339, 1997 WL 689488
(Del. Ch. 1997). That statement, to our minds, cannot reasonably be read as an endorsement of the
inherent coercion doctrine, as Chancellor Allen’s view in TWA and other cases about the ability of
independent directors to perform their duties with impartiality was to the contrary. In re Trans World
Airlines, Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988); see generally
Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 576 A.2d 654, 657-59 (Del. Ch. 1990); J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d
770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-68. We view the Chancellor’s statement simply
as rueful acceptance that if the Supreme Court intended to base Delaware law on the idea that a controller
had overweening retributive power and influence that per se disabled independent directors and minority
stockholders from exercising free will, then it was hard to limit that reasoning to a particular transactional
context. We believe, however, that there are many sound reasons to confine the Lynch doctrine to going
private mergers. Those transactions involve a zero-sum game, which is not true of many other related
party transactions. The controller can achieve the same result by a tender offer, arguably avoiding board
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By way of leading example, in a scholarly and encyclopedic decision, the Court of
Chancery in EZCORP reviewed the post-Lynch case law and concluded that the weight of
authority did not cabin Lynch to the going private context, but applied its inherent coercion
doctrine to all conflict transactions involving controllers.78 In so doing, the court cited decisions
leading up to MFW that said otherwise, including Friedman v. Dolan,79 Canal Capital Corp. v.
French,80 and Tyson,81 an important Chancery decision holding that because a special committee
of independent directors approved executive compensation to a member of a controlling
stockholder’s family, the business judgment standard applied.
EZCORP concluded, however, that cases like Tyson, which applied traditional Delaware
corporate law to controller transactions not requiring a statutory vote, were not persuasive,
because it viewed the inherent coercion theory of Lynch as a continuing principle of the
corporate common law.82 In adopting that view, EZCORP relied upon the power of a controlling
stockholder to wield influence at both the board level and the stockholder level, to justify
subjecting any controller conflict transaction to the entire fairness standard, even a transaction
not requiring a stockholder vote.83 Nevertheless, EZCORP was careful to indicate that the

control and entire fairness review, which is not possible in other contexts. And, mergers require a
statutory vote, which is also not the case with many other transactions, including those involving
compensation.
78
In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig. (EZCORP), No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL
301245, at *11-15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016).
79
C.A. No. 9425-VCN, 2015 WL 4040806 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015).
80
Civ. A. No. 11,764, 1992 WL 159008 (Del. Ch. July 2, 1995).
81
In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007).
82
EZCORP, 2016 WL 301245, at *16, *18.
83
Id. at *30. EZCORP also found that this approach was not unduly burdensome because cases had
shown that controllers could prove fairness, and because there was no persuasive evidence that the
plaintiffs’ bar would sue on any case just because the standard of review precluded dismissal. Id. at *23.
We are not as sanguine, in light of two prior waves of meritless litigation, one caused by Kahn v. Lynch
and the perverse incentives it created. See, for example, the evidence as to meritless Lynch litigation
cited in Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law
(Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797 (2004); In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc.
S’holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005). The second wave of non-meritorious cases involved third
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Delaware Supreme Court had not spoken to the question of whether the MFW dual process
approach was required outside of the going private merger context, or whether use of any of the
traditional cleansing devices would henceforth suffice, to invoke business judgment review.84
We would answer that question differently than EZCORP, and would not apply MFW to
all transactions with controlling stockholders: the MFW solution was tailored specifically to the
problem created by the Lynch line of cases, namely that those cases created poor incentives in
the going private merger context for transactional planners and encouraged wasteful litigation
yielding no benefit for investors or society. The solution MFW embraced credits procedures that,
if implemented with fidelity, give minority stockholders in a squeeze-out merger the key
protections they would receive in a merger with a third party merger: a) fiduciaries actively
negotiating for their benefit; and b) the right to determine for themselves as stockholders whether
the transaction is in their best interests.85 This solution addressed concerns unique to the
controller going private context: the requirement that the controller concede that the special
committee of independent directors could say no responded directly to the concern that the
controller could bypass that committee decision by presenting a tender offer directly to the
minority stockholders.
The MFW solution was never designed to apply to all transactions between controlling
stockholders and companies. MFW repeatedly emphasized that it was addressing only the
context of going private mergers: it defined the question presented as “what should be the correct

party deals. See, for example, ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, March
2012 Update (documenting high incidence of meritless claims attacking third-party mergers in which the
only tangible benefit was the payment of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ lawyers).
84
Id.; see also Cornerstone, 115 A.3d at 1181 (“[T]he burden of providing entire fairness in an interested
merger” falls on the controlling stockholder proposing the transaction in the first instance) (emphasis
added).
85
See M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644.
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standard of review for mergers between a controlling stockholder and its subsidiary,”86 and
recited that “[o]utside the controlling stockholder merger context, it has long been the law that
even when a transaction is an interested one but not requiring a stockholder vote, Delaware law
has invoked the protections of the business judgment rule when the transaction was approved by
disinterested directors acting with due care.”87 Thus, the idea that MFW meant, without saying
so, to define the treatment of all transactions with controlling stockholders is at odds
with MFW’s own text.
It is also at odds with widespread practice. One of the historical functions of audit
committees has been to review and approve such related party transactions,88 and controlling
stockholders — many of which are businesses themselves — often provide or acquire services or
goods to or from the controlled company. Likewise, controlling stockholder representatives
often serve and are compensated as executives, and compensation committees comprised of
independent directors were developed in part to address the potential for such conflicts.89 We
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MFW, 67 A.3d at 524. See also id. at 500 (defining the question presented as “what standard of review
should apply to a going private merger conditioned upfront by the controlling stockholder on approval
by both a properly empowered, independent committee and an informed, uncoerced majority-of-theminority vote.”).
87
Id. at 526-27.
88
See these examples from corporate charters. Audit Committee Charter, Golden Star Resource Corp.,
exh. 99.2 to Form 10KSB filed Sep.28, 2007, available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1375348/000100201407000830/exh992.htm (“The committee
should review, assess, and approve: ... (3) Significant conflicts of interest and related-party
transactions.”); Amended and Restated Audit Committee Charter of WebMD Corp. adopted Feb. 27,
2004, available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001009575/000095014404002444/g87450exv99w1.htm (audit
committee shall “review with management proposed related party transactions … and approve any such
transactions”); City Capital Corp. Audit Committee Charter, exh. 99 to Form 10KSB filed Apr. 25, 2005,
available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000793986/000109432805000090/cityex99042505.txt (audit
committee must “[r]eview and approve all related-party transactions affecting management or any board
member.”).
89
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468, 1490 (2007) (describing the
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never understood that entire fairness review would be universally required in these common
situations, or that the potential for controller self-dealing makes it impossible for the company’s
directors to avoid a judicial fairness inquiry.90
Rather, if one of the traditional cleansing techniques is used, the presumption should be
that the transaction or compensation was approved by impartial fiduciaries who could faithfully
represent the company’s interest in getting a fair deal for itself. In that case, the business
judgment rule would apply unless the plaintiff could use the waste doctrine to create an inference
that an “apparently well motivated board” might not have been. The plaintiff could use this
equitable “safety hatch” by pleading that the “decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.”91
Section 144 of the DGCL further supports this view. The techniques that statute requires
to validate an interested transaction largely reflect those that the common law of corporations
had deemed necessary for the transaction to receive the protection of the business judgment rule,
rather than inflexibly remain subject to entire fairness review.92 With important judicial

rise of compensation committees comprised of independent directors to address potential conflicts and
meet requirements of the NYSE).
90
That this is traditional Delaware law is supported by the excellent articles of three distinguished
lawyers written in response to the American Law Institute’s Corporate Governance project in the early
1990s. See John F. Johnston & Frederick H. Alexander, The Effect of Disinterested Director Approval of
Conflict Transactions Under the ALI Corporate Governance Project —- A Practitioner’s Perspective, 48
BUS. LAW. 1393 (Aug. 1993); Charles Hansen, John F. Johnston, & Frederick H. Alexander, The Role of
Disinterested Directors in ‘Conflict’ Transactions: The ALI Corporate Law Project and Existing Law, 45
BUS. LAW. 2083 (Aug. 1990). In those articles, the authors embrace the view that Delaware law holds
that the use of any of the traditional protective devices with fidelity invokes the business judgment rule.
This reality is not in question outside the controlling stockholder area. For example, in an incisive article,
Vice Chancellor Laster takes this position as to conflict transactions that do not involve a controller.
Laster, supra note 52.
91
In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Inc. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 & n.5 (Del. Ch. 1988).
92
Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (“whether the disputed conduct received the
approval of a noninterested majority of directors or shareholders … is now crystallized in the ratification
criteria of § 144(a).”); Cox, 879 A.2d at 614-15 (stating that the common law of corporations the business
judgment rule and its operation is resembles § 144).
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adaptations to maintain credibility — e.g., the cleansing vote must be one of only the
disinterested stockholders,93 and special committee members must be independent as well as
disinterested94 — the techniques prescribed in § 144 were considered sufficiently robust to
eliminate the need for a fairness inquiry. Just as § 144 was built on equity cases involving
fiduciary duty, and not just technical legal validity, later equity cases were built on the
foundation established by § 144’s codification of the then-recognized techniques for addressing
conflict transactions.
In stating that, we do not exaggerate the consistency or precision with which Delaware
case law addressed the standard of review ultimately applicable to conflict transactions. In
earlier eras, the costs of discovery and the volume of cases facing corporations were smaller, and
the importance of determining whether a case should proceed past the pleading stage was not as
salient.
We also acknowledge the many cases stating that any conflicted self-dealing transaction
with a controlling stockholder is subject initially to the entire fairness standard. Vice Chancellor
Laster’s exhaustive review of cases in his scholarly EZ-Corp decision well documents that
reality.95 And as far as that goes, we agree with that proposition. But that proposition does not,
in itself, answer the important question the Supreme Court of Delaware has yet to answer postMFW: outside of the going private context, what cleansing techniques will change that initial
standard from entire fairness to business judgment review?
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Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-22 (Del. 1976) (failing to accept cleansing effect of a
shareholder vote because less than a majority of the votes cast were from disinterested shareholders).
94
Gesoff v. IIC Indus Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145-46 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“As a threshold matter, the
composition of the special committee is of central importance. . . . [I]ndependence is the sine qua non of
the entire negotiation process.”); see generally Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d at 818-820 (discussing
requirements to be deemed independent).
95
EZCORP, 2016 WL 301245, at *12-15 (collecting cases).
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When Function Over Form was published, independent directors had already shown
themselves capable of standing up to corporate managers, and CEO tenure had been declining as
a result.96 Independent directors increasingly owed their continued access to directorships not to
ties to management, but to their willingness to support policies that powerful institutional
investors liked. These same institutional investors had shown themselves willing to criticize
companies – including those with controlling stockholders – and to dissent at the ballot box.
Moreover, Delaware courts had proven vigilant in policing electoral manipulation and coercion
of stockholders in the voting process, and would readily address any controller who reacted to a
negative vote with retribution.97 Likewise, even controllers had to be sensitive to the prospect
that replacing independent directors who said no to a conflict transaction with ones who would
do their bidding would impair their ability to raise debt and other capital.98 Decisions of the
Delaware courts and actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission had enhanced the
information base available to stockholders about salient developments like M & A transactions.99
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See, for example, these studies documenting these realities, Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, Is There a
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance?, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 924 (1999));
Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 1, 2021 (2012).
97
If a special committee, for example, said no to a related party transaction, and the controller used its
authority to implement it by votes of its affiliate directors, then the entire fairness standard would act as a
watchdog at its toothiest. Facing a suit to justify a transaction that the independent directors had rejected
as unfair is not a situation any rational controller would wish to find itself in.
98
Could they find candidates to do this? Independent directors often serve on more than one board and
will sit on other boards without a controller, where they are likely to face adverse electoral consequences
(withhold votes) from institutional investors and proxy advisors. Other boards seeking new directors will
also likely shy away from the negative attention they can draw to themselves by nominating a director
now regarded by institutional investors and their proxy advisors as a stooge.
99
After the article appeared, disclosures in the transactional context grew even more robust. E.g, Pure
Resources, 808 A.2d at 449 ( (“[S]tockholders are entitled to a fair summary of the substantive work
performed by the investment bankers upon whose advices the recommendations of their board as to how
to vote on a merger or tender rely”); Gordon, supra note 89, at 1543, 1548 (discussing the trend that
corporations have been disclosing increasingly more information into the early 2000s, in part motivated
by new SEC disclosure regimes).
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For those reasons, Function Over Form argued that Lynch’s inherent coercion theory was
empirically baseless.
Market activity since then has only strengthened that argument. Institutional investors
have a powerful voice, no fear of controlling stockholders or corporate management.
Stockholders challenge them frequently, and they have hedge funds and the media to help them.
Independent directors are under great scrutiny too, and are expected to act aggressively in M&A
situations to make sure that the public investors get a good deal. Proxy advisors and analysts
scrutinize deals and help institutional investors decide how to vote.100 Annual say on pay votes
exist at most companies, and independent directors who run afoul of investor and proxy advisor
sentiment over pay policies at one company (even ones with a controlling stockholder) can face
withhold votes at other companies on whose boards they serve.101 In light of these market
developments, all of the constraints discussed earlier -- judicial review under the entire fairness standard
where a controller replaces directors who stand in its way, the prospect of adverse effects on financing,
and reputational damage with institutional investors and the press -- would at least as forcefully deter a
controller in settings involving conflict transactions other than going private mergers. Thus, even more

now than when Function Over Form was published, there is no reason to base the law on the
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E.g., Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality, 50 EMORY L.J. 869, 870
(2010).
101
Articles citing evidence of the network efforts on directors include Yonca Ertimur, et al., Board of
Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53,
54 (2010).); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to
Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 88 (2016). Independent directors often serve on more
than one board, and most will sit on other boards without a controller. Most directors hope to be in the
game for some time and to join other boards. Institutional investors and proxy advisors do not let a
director knuckle under to the controller at Company A, without facing electoral consequences at
Companies B and C, where a withhold vote can effectively unseat them. Nor will other boards seeking
new directors ignore the negative attention they can draw to themselves by sitting a director now regarded
as a stooge.
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view that stockholders cannot protect themselves at the ballot box, or that independent directors
do not take their duties seriously when considering conflict transactions.102
The retributive rationale underlying the inherent coercion doctrine has also been undercut
in a decisive way by MFW, if it and its predecessors are taken seriously. As we have
discussed,103 Lynch’s inherent coercion doctrine rested on the premise that a controller could
bypass a special committee, make a going private tender offer, and escape ultimate fairness
review.104 That premise, unique to the going private context, would disappear if the Delaware
Supreme Court were to make clear that a going private tender offer by a controller would be
subject to the same level of judicial review as a going private merger,105 and the condition in
MFW that the controller cannot bypass the special committee or the minority stockholders would
be rendered superfluous. Put simply, if, as MFW, Cox, Pure, and leading scholars suggest,106 the
equitable review of a going private transaction should not be driven primarily by statutory form,
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Applying MFW to transactions where no statutory vote is required has had odd results. In Tornetta v.
Musk, 250 A.3d 793, 809-10 (Del. Ch. 2019). a board felt that it could not constitute a sufficiently
independent compensation committee, so it put the compensation package it negotiated with the CEO to a
vote of the stockholders not affiliated with the CEO, who approved it based on materially complete
disclosures. Because it applied MFW, however, per EZCORP, the court ruled that a trial would be
necessary to determine the fairness of a compensation package that the stockholders of a major
corporation on full information approved, thereby requiring the court to substitute its own law-trained
business judgment for that of informed, disinterested persons with a financial stake. We see no basis for
such judicial review. Appraising a company sold in a conflicted merger with no market test is difficult
enough; judicial pricing of compensation packages plans is unmoored in standards that would make any
exercise of discretion reviewable in any coherent and consistent way.
103
See supra at note 61 and accompanying text.
104
Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.
105
In MFW, Cox, and Pure Resources, Chancery discussed the reality that Delaware law had taken a
different view of going private tender offers by controllers and suggested doctrinal convergence. See
Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 440-45; Cox, 879 A.2d. at 623-24 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re MFW S’holders
Litig., 67 A.3d 535-36 (Del. Ch. 2013). For a case applying this doctrine, see Eisenberg v. Chi.
Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1987).
106
See M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644-46; Cox, 879 A.2d at 614-17; Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 43435, 438-39; see also Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory, Evidence & Policy, 36 J.
LEG. STUD. 1 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 785, 800-03 (2003).
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especially when the merger route is more protective of minority stockholders, a foundational
premise of the entire Lynch doctrine goes away.
For these reasons, MFW should be viewed as articulating a targeted solution to a targeted
problem created in large measure by the anomaly in the case law arguably allowing a controller
to use a tender offer to escape both a special committee’s veto and fairness review, and not as
prescribing a rigid set of procedures applicable to any transaction between a controlling
stockholder and a company. Given the importance of going private mergers and the concerns this
anomaly creates, we embrace the principled approach MFW took to replicating the protections afforded to
stockholders under the DGCL in a third-party, arms-length merger. Because this bypass anomaly does

not exist in other settings and because the inherent coercion doctrine is flawed and should not
form a further basis for making corporate common law, we would not extend MFW beyond the
going private context. But if it is to be extended, at most MFW’s two key protections should
apply when a self-dealing transaction is statutorily required to be approved by stockholders.107
Applying MFW when a self-dealing transaction must be approved by the stockholders and the
board would have some logic, because it would match the basic reasoning of the decision.108 But
where no stockholder vote is required, MFW’s procedures have no fit, and their extension to such
contexts involves judicial action better described as statute writing.

107

For example, an acquisition of a company owned by the controller, where stockholder approval is
required by statute because the buying company has to issue stock in sufficient quantity that § 251(f) of
the DGCL requires a stockholder vote.
108
Moreover, if that were done, MFW should apply only to a transaction as such, and not to other contexts
where a stockholder vote is required and a conflict of interest exists, such as a certificate amendment that
would create a class of high vote stock to be owned by the controller to enable it to maintain control while
the company issues more equity to workers or other investors. So long as the charter amendment is
subject to approval by a fully informed majority of the minority vote, then there is, in our view, no basis
for subjecting the amendment to some unworkable form of “fairness review.”
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Extending Lynch’s inherent coercion doctrine after MFW had effectively rejected it,
thereby dooming to failure any motion to dismiss unless the controller employs the costly MFW
procedures, will not generate systemic value for diversified stockholders. Instead, it is more
likely to result in excessive transaction costs, increased D & O insurance costs, and contrived
settlements designed only to avoid the costs of discovery and justify the attorneys’ fee that
motivates most corporate representative suits.109
Corporate law is not designed for perfection. Although fairness is important, and
investors must have protections against abuse, investors and society risk much if courts act as if
they can capably address all situational concerns, and impose a toll on innovation, flexibility, and
the cost of capital by facilitating litigation rent-seeking in situations when sufficient, intracorporate guarantees of fairness have been employed. Corporate jurisprudence cannot require a
microscopic review of every situation that might involve unfairness. Rather, it must rely on rules
that incentivize the use of high-integrity procedures in most cases, and reduce the costs to society
and investors of litigation and judicial second-guessing.
Accordingly, Delaware law should embrace the direction of MFW and Function Over
Form, by reaffirming that most conflict transactions, even with a controlling stockholder, receive
the protection of the business judgment rule if one of the three traditional cleansing procedures is
credibly employed. Given vibrant stockholder power, the increased information available to
them and the plaintiffs who represent them, the reputational and electoral implications for
independent directors who bend to controllers’ wills, and the potent ability of Chancery to police
retribution by a controller that does not get its way, the benefits of the traditional approach
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The wave of meritless suits under Lynch itself, and of meritless non-Revlon, Revlon claims when
defendants were faced with forum shopping, demonstrates that our concerns are based in empirics, not
irrational fears. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (citing evidence of these waves).
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outweigh the risks, and plaintiffs’ lawyers would be encouraged to win cases on the merits, not
extract fees based on an overly litigation-intensive standard of review.
B.

Expanding MFW by Expanding the Definition of “Controlling Stockholder”

The “MFW creep” described in the previous section has been exacerbated by expanding
the definition of a “controlling stockholder.” If pleading that a conflict transaction involves a
“controlling stockholder” inexorably requires a trial on entire fairness, the occasion for such after
the fact economic review expands if courts expand the definition of a controlling stockholder.
Under Delaware law, it was historically difficult to establish that a stockholder having
less than majority ownership was a controlling stockholder. Even in Aronson, where the main
defendant, the former CEO and Chairman, controlled 47% of the vote, had close affiliations with
several directors, and had an ongoing consulting arrangement, the court declined to infer control
at the pleading stage.110
Kahn v. Lynch111 took a more expansive view of the term “controlling stockholder.”
Alcatel, a 43.3% stockholder that was contractually limited to electing a minority of the board,
was nonetheless found to be a controlling stockholder, based on evidence that the nonmanagement directors had previously accepted Alcatel’s refusal to renew management contracts
that those directors had supported. Following Lynch, the Court of Chancery in Cysive determined
that the founder, CEO and Chairman of the company, who owned 35 percent of the shares (but
effectively 40 percent, taking into account stock options and shares owned by family members
and subordinates),112 was a controlling stockholder. The court reasoned that he owned a large
enough percentage of shares to be a dominant force in any contested election and exercise
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Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808.
Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1114-15.
112
Cysive, 836 A.2d at 535.
111
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managerial supremacy over the company.113 Still, the court’s reasoning remained deeply tied to
voting, not just managerial power: as the court explained, “the analysis of whether a controlling
stockholder exists must take into account whether the stockholder, as a practical matter,
possesses a combination of stock voting power and managerial authority that enables him to
control the corporation, if he so wishes.”114 And some subsequent rulings have been cautious in
determining that a minority holder with a significant role in the company was a controller.115
Our concern, however, is that the revival of Lynch’s inherent coercion theory has created
pressure to expand the definition of controlling stockholder to reach persons having far less than
a voting majority, but are either critically important to the company or associated with other
stockholders as a group. Tesla Motors116 illustrates the first of these two categories. Tesla’s
CEO, Elon Musk, held only about 22 percent of the company’s voting power, but taking into
account apparent board level conflicts and Musk’s acknowledgements that he had substantial

113

Id. at 552-53 (applying Kahn v. Lynch). According to the court:
The conclusion that Carbonell possesses the attributes that the Lynch doctrine is designed to
address is reinforced when one takes into account the fact that Carbonell is Chairman and CEO of
Cysive, and a hands-on one, to boot. He is, by admission, involved in all aspects of the company's
business, was the company's creator, and has been its inspirational force.
114
Id. at 553.
115
In one such case, the court held that the defendant, who owned 46 percent of outstanding stock, was
not a controlling shareholder because non-majority ownership without more is insufficient to demonstrate
control, and it was contractually limited to electing just two of the eight directors. In re W. Nat’l Corp.
S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192 at *6 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000); cf. Orman v. Cullman, 794
A.2d 5, 16-17 (Del. Ch. 2002) (holding that an entity owning 67 percent voting power in a company,
despite owning only 37 percent of the shares outstanding, was a controlling stockholder). In another case,
the putative controller’s 27 percent ownership and right to appoint two of ten directors were held
insufficient to support a rational inference that there was effective control. In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc.
S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 661 (Del. Ch. 2013). And in yet another case the court concluded that a
defendant that held only one percent of the company’s shares and was therefore unable to replace
directors was not a controlling shareholder, even though it managed the company’s operations. In re KKR
Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 983, 994 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d sub nom Corwin v.
KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
116
In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 12711–VCS, 2018 WL 1560293 at *12 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 28, 2018).
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influence over the company and the board, the court found a reasonable inference that Musk was
a controlling stockholder.117
Although that finding may have been appropriate, we are concerned that the court’s
reasoning in applying controlling stockholder doctrine sweeps too broadly. Even if Musk were
not a controller, the finding that a majority of the directors were beholden to Musk would in
itself invoke fairness review and demand excusal under the first prong of Aronson. The other
finding – that Musk was so talented and visionary that the company could not succeed without
him – does not rationally imply that someone is a controlling stockholder.118 Being valuable to
the company does not make an executive a controlling stockholder, nor does it implicate the
concerns underlying Lynch – namely, the potential to use affirmative voting power to unseat
directors and implement transactions that the minority stockholders do not like, and use blocking
voting power to impede other transactions.119
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Id. at *14-19. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that Musk had a history of helping to expel
managers when he was displeased with their decisions; he brought the contested acquisition to the board
on multiple occasions; a majority of the board members involved in the transaction were not disinterested
or were beholden to Musk; and Musk was highly involved in Tesla’s management embracing his role as
an instrumental part of the business.
118
See Id. at *19. See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 25 (Del.
2017) (rejecting argument that controller status could be grounded on the defendant’s importance as a
founder and successful CEO when he did not have close to voting control and had pledged to vote his
shares in favor of a higher-priced transaction).
119
In an article explaining why controlling stockholders had been treated differently by Lynch and cases
adopting its inherent coercion doctrine, Vice Chancellor Laster emphasized the importance of
considerable voting control:
The presence of a controller creates a special case because the controller’s influence
operates at both the board and stockholder levels. It is not uncommon for a controller to
nominate a majority of the corporation’s directors. Agents, employees, and other
fiduciaries of the controller, who serve on the corporation’s board, face a conflict of
interest arising from their respective dual fiduciary statuses. The controller’s influence
also undercuts the independence of otherwise independent and disinterested directors,
because the controller has the power to determine whether those individuals will remain
directors. At the stock-holder level, the controller can simply dictate the outcome of a
vote.
Laster, supra note 52 at 1460. When a stockholder has no ability to dictate the vote, this rationale
disappears.
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The second avenue for expanding the controlling stockholder definition is to aggregate
the voting power of stockholders holding blocs of shares, even though they are not bound by a
voting agreement or founding family ties. These stockholders are then treated as a “control
group” with the same force and effect on the standard of review as if they were a majority
stockholder. If the only rationale for this treatment of otherwise disaggregated stockholders is
that they had a similar view about a specific transaction’s favorability, despite having no
obligation or prior record of being tied together as to all issues, this mode of “situational control
group” analysis should be applied with great caution. Aggregating into a single unit stockholders
united only by a common view of what will optimize the value of their shares would enable
plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss with no further proof that these stockholders, even if
they hold fiduciary positions, breached their duty of loyalty.
To cabin this danger, the Delaware Supreme Court has required plaintiffs seeking to
establish that the defendants are part of a control group to demonstrate that they entered into a
contract, common ownership, agreement, or other arrangement where they worked toward a
common goal.120 Although several opinions have faithfully applied that requirement,121 other
cases appear more adventuresome. In Dubroff II, 122 the court found that the alleged facts
120

Sheldon v. Pinto Techs. Ventures, L.P., 220 A.3d 245, 251-2 (Del. 2019) (declining to treat venture
capital investors as a group, despite their participation in a voting agreement concerning the election of
directors, where they were free to vote independently on other transactions).
121
Patel v. Duncan, No. 2020-0418-MTZ, 2021 Del. Ch. LEXIS 227 (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2021)
(declining to treat two private equity firms as a control group, due to absence of allegations of significant
historical ties or any transaction-specific agreement); van der Fluit v. Yates, 2017 WL 5953514 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 30, 2017) (declining to find that venture capital investors who were parties to an investment
agreement, but had no agreement concerning the challenged transaction, constituted a control group); In
re PNB Hldg. Co. S’holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006)) (“[R]ejecting
claim that ‘some twenty people (directors, officers, spouses, children, and parents)’ comprised a control
group and noting that ‘there are no voting agreements between directors or family member[s]. Rather, it
appears that each had the right to, and every incentive to, act in his or her own self-interest as a
stockholder.’”).
122
Dubroff v. Wren Holdings, LLC, C.A. Nos. 3940-VCN, 6017-VCN, 2011 WL 5137175, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 28, 2011).
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supported an inference that three otherwise unaffiliated investors had acted as a controlling
shareholder by engaging in a series of transactions that had enriched them at the expense of the
minority shareholders, and by “work[ing] together to establish the exact terms and timing” of the
challenged recapitalization. In Frank v. Elgamal, 123 plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss by
alleging members of the allegedly controlling group were united in entering into three
agreements, despite having no voting agreement or common ownership. Relying on Frank,
Hansen Medical held that allegations indicating coordination between the otherwise independent
members of the supposed control group in previous transactions precluded dismissal where the
members concurrently received benefits unavailable to minority shareholders in the contested
transaction.124
This phenomenon is troublesome, particularly if extended to putative groups of
stockholder-directors. If several directors are “interested” in a transaction for purposes of § 144,
then that has important implications for the standard of review. But assessment of those
implications should not be oversimplified by lumping together those directors’ shares if they
have no obligation to vote those shares uniformly. Delaware law generally regards share
ownership by directors as useful, as it helps align the economic interests of directors with those
of other stockholders. But the law should not reflexively deem a group of interested directors a
controlling stockholder merely because they vote identically in one transaction.
Another troublesome issue arises where a court accepts the claim (at least for purposes of
a motion to dismiss) that a person is a controller, with concomitant fiduciary obligations, despite
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Frank v. Elgamal, C.A. No. 6120–VCN, 2012 WL 1096090 at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012).
In re Hansen Medical, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 12316–VCMR, 2018 WL 3030808 at *6-9 (Del.
Ch. June 18, 2018).
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owning no shares of stock at all.125 To be sure, if a non-stockholder that exercises control
through ownership of or managerial authority over a parent entity uses that control to exercise
voting or managerial control of a subsidiary entity takes on fiduciary duties to the controlled
subsidiary.126 Our concern, however, is that the amorphous concept of “soft power” not arising
out of stock ownership could be applied to trigger the entire fairness standard and preclude
dismissal, where the premise of control involves circumstances that reflect garden variety
commercial dealings, such as “the exercise of contractual rights to channel the corporation into a
particular outcome by blocking or restricting other paths, … the existence of commercial
relationships that provide the defendant with leverage over the corporation, such as status as a
key customer or supplier, [or] [l]ending relationships, [which] can be particularly potent sources
of influence.”127 The courts should heed doctrinal guardrails against overuse of this “soft power”
concept: “authority [that] takes the form of a contractual right … must give the nonstockholder
power akin to ‘operating the decision-making machinery of the corporation’ (a ‘classic
fiduciary’), rather than ‘an individual who owns a contractual right, and who exploits that right,’
forcing a corporation to 'react' (which does not support a fiduciary status).”128
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In re Pattern Energy Grp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 2020-0357-MTZ, 2021 WL 1812674, at *115-16
(Del. Ch. May. 6, 2021) (“[C]onsidering evolving market realities and corporate structures affording
effective control, Delaware law may countenance extending controller status and fiduciary duties to a
nonstockholder that holds and exercises soft power that displaces the will of the board with respect to a
particular decision or transaction.”); In re EZCORP Inc., No. 9962-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at
*26-27 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (“An ultimate human controller who engages directly or indirectly in an
interested transaction with a corporation is potentially liable for breach of duty, even if other corporate
actors made the formal decision on behalf of the corporation, and even if the controller participated in the
transaction through intervening entities.”).
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E.g., Eshleman v. Keenan, 187 A. 25 (Del. Ch. 1936), aff’d 2 A.2d 904 (Del. 1938) (individuals who
controlled parent company through a voting trust owed fiduciary duties to the subsidiary corporation of
which the parent was the majority stockholder).
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2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 222, *61-62 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018).
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Pattern Energy, 2021 WL 1812674, at *122.
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Perhaps most importantly, pressures by plaintiffs to characterize defendants as
controlling stockholders when they possess far less than majority ownership, and even
unaffiliated defendants as a “situational control bloc,” could be reduced by returning to a robust
recognition of the cleansing effect of informed independent director or stockholder approval.
Interested transactions would not consequently receive starkly different treatment solely because
the interested party defendants are characterized as a control group.
C.

The Related Temptation to Expand the Definition of Self-Dealing Transactions.

Renewed recognition of the cleansing effect of informed independent director or
stockholder approval would solve a separate and increasingly difficult classification problem:
determining when a non-ratable benefit to a corporate fiduciary triggers entire fairness review.
Non-ratable benefits come in many varieties: severance benefits for management, officer or
director positions in the surviving corporation, different liquidity desires even in a pro rata
transaction, a higher price for a class of stock with admittedly far greater value because of its
voting control, an opportunity to acquire an equity interest in the acquiring company, and
elimination of potential derivative claims, to name just a few.
Like the pressure to characterize interested parties as controllers, MFW creep encourages
plaintiffs to argue that non-ratable benefits to a fiduciary that accompany otherwise third-party
transactions constitute a conflict of interest that triggers entire fairness review. There is
precedent supporting this position,129 and we agree that a non-ratable benefit can require
application of the entire fairness standard where (i) neither of the traditional cleansing
mechanisms (independent director or stockholder approval) has been used and (ii) the fiduciary
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E.g., In re Viacom Inc. S’holders Litig., 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 373, *40-41 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2020)
(quoting In re Crimson, 2014 WL 5449419, at *12) (taking this position)..
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who received the benefit negotiated the main terms of the transaction and determined the
allocation of the proceeds in a direct self-dealing manner.130
But Delaware courts should be cautious about expanding the use of non-ratable benefits
as a basis for expanding the scope of the definition of self-dealing transactions. Entire fairness
review serves as a check on self-dealing, by requiring a party that essentially negotiated with
itself prove that what it received or gave constituted fair value. That function, however, is not
implicated where a third party negotiates a merger with a company that has two classes of shares,
and bargains over the price paid for each, and each class has a voluntary, informed class vote.
Likewise, managers are entitled to contract for their future services and to receive fair
compensation if they lose their job in a deal. Admittedly, it is problematic when directors or
stockholders approve a transaction without realizing the existence of a non-ratable benefit to a
fiduciary; but where that benefit is fully disclosed and approved, its recipient should not be
required to disprove that it came at the expense of the corporation or the stockholders generally.
Likewise, the fact that a controlled company makes a decision benefiting its parent should not
invoke the entire fairness standard absent harm to the corporation or the minority stockholders.131
Controllers should not have to pay rents to the minority to, for example, conduct business in a
tax efficient manner. So long as the controller does not extract value from the minority, there is
no proper basis for fairness review to apply. In sum, we submit that invoking the business
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E.g., Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986). In that case, the controlling
stockholder of MGM Grand negotiated a merger with a third-party acquirer. But, rather than have the
independent directors control the negotiations, the controller conducted the negotiations himself and then
determined how the total consideration that the acquirer was willing to pay would be split between
himself and other stockholders. In other words, he dealt directly with himself with the pool of funds the
acquirer was willing to pay to the company as a whole. In that context, the court determined to subject
the transaction to the entire fairness standard. Id. at 596.
131
E.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
479 A.2d 276, 281 (Del. 1984); Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 405 (Del.
1988).
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judgment rule based on use of any of the traditional cleansing protections would normalize and
rationalize the judicial treatment of transactions involving non-ratable benefits to a fiduciary.132
More generally, we believe, as with duty of care claims, any plaintiff arguing that a nonratable benefit was a breach of the duty of loyalty should have to prove breach and resulting
damages. The entire fairness standard should not be wheeled out to address these kinds of cases
in an awkward and confusing way. So long as the plaintiff has the chance to prove a breach of
this kind (e.g., that none of the protective devices was used with credibility or that the recipient
fiduciary engaged in bad faith overreaching) and damages (harm to company and other
stockholders), a more than adequate deterrent exists.
D.

Undermining Aronson’s Important Second Prong And Creating Inconsistent
Assumptions About The Ability of Independent Directors To Make Impartial
Decisions

The Delaware Supreme Court recently affirmed a ruling in which the Court of Chancery
concluded that the two-prong demand requirement test articulated in 1984 in Aronson v. Lewis133
is “no longer a functional test,”134 and that demand can be excused only by demonstrating that a
majority of directors face a claim of liability not exculpated by a charter provision under §
102(b)(7).135 Although we have no quarrel with the result reached in the case (dismissal),136 that
132

This was the approach of Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“Here, however, although
the Cullman Group was the controlling shareholder of the target company both before and after the
merger, the Cullman Group did not stand on both sides of the challenged merger. Instead it was
approached by, and began initial negotiations with, an unaffiliated third party, Swedish Match. A Special
Committee of independent directors then completed those negotiations. Therefore, the burden remains on
Orman to allege other facts sufficient to overcome the business judgment presumption.”).
133
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
134
United Food & Com. Workers Union & Participating Food Indus. Empls. Tri-State Pension Fund v.
Zuckerberg (Zuckerberg), 250 A.3d 862, 886 (Del. Ch. 2020), aff’d, [ ] A.3d. [] (2021); see also id.
(“[T]he first prong of Aronson remains viable, but . . . [t]he second prong of Aronson remains viable only
in the unlikely event that a corporation lacks a Section 102(b)(7) provision, or to the extent that the
particularized factual allegations portray a transaction that is so extreme as to suggest bad faith.”).
135
See id. at 885-86.
136
Zuckerberg involved unusual and troublesome claims, and we have no quarrel with the result
(dismissal). A previous lawsuit challenged a reclassification intended to enable the founder to sell shares
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approach precludes the use of the second prong of Aronson’s demand futility test to challenge
self-interested transactions where the pled facts support an inference that a conflict transaction
unfairly benefited an interested party and the independent directors acted with gross negligence
(but not disloyalty) in approving it. That approach also thereby encourages courts to strain to
infer bad faith on the part of such directors to avoid dismissing a loyalty claim against the
interested party that would historically have satisfied Aronson’s second demand utility prong.
Neither development is salutary, in our view. The treatment of Aronson in any event clashes with
the inherent coercion rationale discussed above as the foundation for “MFW creep,” and the two
doctrinal approaches cannot logically co-exist.
1.

Why Post-Aronson Developments Did Not Warrant Abandonment of the Second
Prong

The Supreme Court’s Zuckerberg opinion largely accepts the analysis of the Court of
Chancery, and rests on the proposition that three developments in Delaware law post-dating
Aronson made its second prong no longer a useful way to evaluate demand futility.137 For
starters, Zuckerberg suggests that under Aronson merely pleading that the challenged transaction
is one that would, as an initial matter, not be subject to the business judgment standard of review

and give the proceeds to charity, yet still maintain voting control. Id. at 869-70. The reclassification was
abandoned, and the corporation was required to pay a sizable attorneys’ fee based on mootness. Id. at
875. Nevertheless, in the follow-on derivative suit, plaintiffs alleged that the directors “’violated their
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty’ by pursuing and approving the Reclassification.” Id. In light of the
prior determination that the challenge to the Reclassification was moot, we do not grasp how that followon claim did not constitute in essence a collateral attack on the dismissal of the prior case. The later
lawsuit was thus better understood as a challenge to the decision made or countenanced by the board to
have the company, rather than Mr. Zuckerberg and other directors, pay the fee. It was therefore this
decision, and not the approval of the abandoned transaction, that should have been the subject of the
demand excusal test. The court did not conclude otherwise, but chose simply to assume that the operative
decision was approval of the reclassification. 250 A.3d at 892. No pled facts, however, supported an
inference that the decision to have the company pay the attorneys’ fee was a breach of fiduciary duty,
especially given court oversight of the fee award and the directors’ strong advancement and
indemnification rights.
137
____ A.3d at ___[2021 WL 434436 at *10-12].
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itself satisfies Aronson’s second prong, a suggestion that echoes the Chancery decision it
affirmed.138 Second, the opinion explains away several cases decided in the wake of Aronson on
the ground that § 102(b)(7) had not been enacted when they were decided.139 Finally, the court
suggested that its decision in Cornerstone, holding that directors against whom no nonexculpated claim has been pled should be dismissed on a proper Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if
non-exculpated claims exist against other directors (such as the interested party in a conflict
transaction), was a further development undermining the rationale for Aronson’s second
prong.140
Building on these premises, Aronson’s second prong was seen as somehow too easy to
satisfy — because it was triggered solely by pleading an initial standard of review, not
particularized facts supporting an inference of ultimate breach (premise one) — and not fitting a
world where independent directors can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if they only face an
exculpated due care claim (premise two). The solution to this perceived problem was to abandon
the second prong and essentially have the rule of Rales v. Blasband govern all demand cases,141
thereby requiring a showing that a majority of the demand board face a non-exculpated claim or
are not independent from the interested party. The universal demand excusal test thus became
the following:
138

Id. at [*10]. The Supreme Court opinion recites that “Aronson used the standard of review as a proxy
for whether the board could impartially consider a litigation demand.” The Chancery opinion was more
precise in expressing its view that Aronson’s second prong could be satisfied by pleading that the initial
standard of review determined demand futility: 250 A.3d at 880-81 (“After Tremont and Lynch, a natural
reading of Aronson’s second prong would suggest that demand becomes futile when entire fairness
applies ab initio.”).
139
Id., citing Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205-06 (Del. 1991) and C.L. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d
1207, 1216 (Del. 1996). This explanation, however, rests on a factual error: the opinion recites (_ A.3d at
[]) that § 102(b)(7) was adopted in 1995, but in fact it was adopted, with great publicity, in 1986, barely
two years after Aronson, and long before Levine and Grimes were decided. 65 Del. Laws, c. 289, §§ 1, 2;
see, e.g., Leo Herzel, Relief for Directors, FIN. TIMES (July 17, 1986), Section I at 11.
140
Id., _ A.3d at [*12].
141
Id. at [*7, *16], citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
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(i)

whether the director received a material personal benefit from the
alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand;

(ii)

whether the director would face a substantial likelihood of liability
on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand;
and

(iii)

whether the director lacks independence from someone who
received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct
that is the subject of the litigation demand or who would face a
substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the
subject of the litigation demand.142

Under this test, if Aronson’s second prong was to be preserved at all, a plaintiff could
only satisfy it by pleading particularized facts supporting a non-exculpated claim against the
demand board majority. In our view, that approach eradicates the historical function of
Aronson’s second prong as a safety valve. Although a rational policy choice, discussed below,
can be made in favor of that approach, such an important new policy shift cannot be justified on
the grounds that intervening developments have made Aronson’s second prong, as originally
intended to be applied, of no continuing utility.
Beginning with the first of the three developments summarized above, we believe that the
purpose of the second prong was never about pleading an initial standard of review; rather, it
required pleading facts supporting an inference of an ultimate breach of duty.143 Aronson's
142

Id. at [*16] (quoting and adopting the Court of Chancery’s proposed new test, 250 A.3d at 890). With
admirable candor, the Chancery decisions suggesting that Aronson be abandoned in favor of a universal
test based on Rales acknowledged that their reconstruction of Aronson’s second prong was a
reformulation of its originally intended application. E.g., In re Tilray, Inc. Reorganization. Litig., Cons.
C.A. No. 2020-0137-KSM, 2021 WL 2199123, at *16 (Del. Ch. June 1, 2021); Zuckerberg, 250 A.3d at
886.
143
E.g., Parfi Hldg., AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1231 n.47 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“The
complaint pleads particularized facts that suggest that the entire fairness standard of review —rather than
the business judgment rule — would apply to the Transactions and that the Transactions might not have
been fair.”) (emphasis added). If pleading that a transaction was an interested one was enough to satisfy
the second prong, then Aronson itself – a case involving the compensation of a stockholder, current
director, and former CEO owning 47% of the vote – would have come out differently. As it was, the
court found that the plaintiff had not pled particularized facts supporting an inference that a breach of
fiduciary duty occurred.
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second prong explicitly calls on the Court of Chancery to inquire into “the substantive nature of
the challenged transaction and the board’s approval thereof.”144 This means that a plaintiff
cannot plead demand excusal under the second prong simply by noting that the transaction, as an
initial matter, is subject to entire fairness review. To the contrary, the second prong has often
been found not satisfied when that standard initially applied.145 If, for example, a special
committee of independent directors approves a conflict transaction, and the plaintiff cannot plead
particularized facts suggesting that the special committee process was tainted by some
wrongdoing (e.g., fraud on the committee by the interested party or gross negligence by the
special committee), then demand is not excused.146 The second prong requires pleading

144

473 A.2d at 814.
For example, then Vice Chancellor (later Justice) Berger understood Aronson this way. See Canal
Cap. Corp. v. French, C.A. No. 11764, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133 (Del. Ch. July 2, 1992). Canal
involved a challenge to advisory fees paid to companies controlled by a 52% stockholder, transactions to
which the entire fairness standard would initially apply. The court nevertheless dismissed under Rule
23.1, finding no basis to infer that the directors (a majority of whom were found to be disinterested and
independent) breached their duty of care in approving the fees, and therefore concluded that Aronson’s
second prong was not satisfied. Id. at *16-17.
The following cases all involve interested transactions, where absent use of a traditional cleansing
mechanism (informed approval by a majority of minority shareholders or an independent committee of
disinterested directors), the burden would be to prove entire fairness. In each of these cases, demand was
found not excused under Aronson’s second prong because the court, upon review, found that the plaintiffs
had not met their burden to plead particularized facts supporting an inference of an ultimate breach of
fiduciary duty. See Chester Cnty. Empls.’ Ret. Fund v. New Residential Inv. Corp., C.A. No. 11058VCMR, 2017 WL 4461131, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2017); Kandell ex rel. FXCM, Inc. v. Niv, C.A.
No. 11812-VCG, 2017 WL 4334149, at *12, *15 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2017); Ryan v. Armstrong, C.A. No.
12717-VCG, 2017 WL 2062902, at *17-18 (Del. Ch. May 15, 2017); Teamsters Union 25 Health Servs.
& Ins. Plan v. Baiera, 119 A.3d 44, 65-68, 65 n.121, 68 n.132 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“Given that the second
prong of Aronson asks simply whether the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment, . . . it is understandable how one might find that test to be satisfied
whenever entire fairness review might be triggered, irrespective of the circumstances triggering such
review or the nature of the claims to which such review might apply.”).
146
In discussing its view that the initial standard of review is determinative under Aronson’s second
prong, the Chancery decision in Zuckerberg cites Unocal cases that supposedly involve derivative claims.
250 A.3d at 881-82. This line of case rests on the original confusion caused by the odd categorization in
early cases of Unocal challenges — that is, stockholder challenges to the use of defensive measures — as
derivative. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985) (holding that a challenge to a pill not directed at a specific bid was derivative). This has never
made sense, because blocking a takeover does not cause balance sheet injury but direct harm to
stockholders. E.g., Williams Cos., 2021 WL at *16-20 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021) (explaining why a
145
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particularized facts that supports a pleading stage inference that an ultimate breach of fiduciary
duty occurred. That goes well beyond pleading an initial standard of review. Thus, properly
applied, there is not a danger that the second prong of Aronson easily allows a plaintiff to usurp a
board’s presumptive authority to control the company’s claims. The rigorous requirement to
plead particularized facts support a rational inference of ultimate breach assures that is not the
case.
As for the second and third developments that supposedly undermined Aronson’s second
prong, we do not believe that the Delaware courts applied Aronson’s second prong for over 30
years without considering the impact of the enactment of § 102(b)(7) in 1986, and the longstanding potential for due care exculpation should have no bearing upon the continued utility of
Aronson’s second prong.147 Delaware’s corporate bar readily understood that § 102(b)(7) created
situations where approving an interested transaction could result in monetary liability of the
interested directors, but not of independent directors acting in the good faith belief the
transaction was fair to the corporation.148 Likewise, Cornerstone was not a seismic change in

Unocal claim attacking the reasonableness of a pill involves a direct, not derivative claim, and citing In re
Gaylord Container Corp., S’holders Litig., 747 A.2d 71, 81 (Del. Ch. 1999)). Moreover, Unocal was
designed as a tool to determine whether to grant injunctive relief, not money damages, and its entire
rationale rested on an “omnipresent specter” that even independent directors might use defensive
measures unreasonably, and thus the independent directors must prove to the court the reasonableness of
their defensive decisions. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. That is, the very premise of Unocal was that the court
should review takeover defense challenges, and that the role of independent directors in determining the
defensive response should be a relevant factor in whether the board met its burden to show that its
defensive actions were reasonable. Unocal cases are thus not a good guide to how Aronson applies to
true derivative cases — ones in which it is alleged that the company was harmed by a self-interested
transaction.
147
Rales was decided seven years after §102(b)(7) was enacted, and even longer after Van Gorkom made
clear that each director had to be examined individually in terms of their culpability. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888-89. The Rales court nevertheless viewed Aronson as still being fully viable in
the bulk of derivative cases where a majority of the board that made the challenged decision is still in
office. Rales, 634 A.2d at 933-34.
148
E.g., Gesoff, 902 A.2d at 1167 (exonerating a disinterested director despite finding other directors
liable in a freezeout merger); In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 2004 WL
1305745, 2004 Del.Ch. LEXIS 70 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (same).
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practice under § 102(b)(7), as it was hardly the first case to recognize that individual directors
not subjected to a non-exculpated claim should be dismissed149 and not have to remain as
defendants just because other defendants face non-exculpated loyalty claims.150 In sum, no case
law or legislative developments after Aronson warranted abandoning its important second prong.
2.

Rales Should Not Displace Aronson’s Second Prong Because the Contexts
of the Two Cases Differ.

It is also significant that the Zuckerberg decisions, which stress the functional similarities
between the Rales test and the Aronson test,151 overlook what is different about the context in
which Rales applies – namely, when at least a majority of the board that would receive a demand
is different than the one that made the decision that is the subject of the complaint.152 That is,
Rales applies when a board either in whole or at least in majority is not asked to cause the
company to sue someone over a decision that they had made.153 Delaware law has often looked
to whether an independent board majority exists in terms of the deference it affords a decision,
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See Cornerstone, 115 A.3d at 1182 n.36 (citing, inter alia, Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648,
677 (Del. Ch. 2014)) (quoting Emerging Commc’ns2004 WL 1305745, at *38 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004)
(“The liability of the directors must be determined on an individual basis because the nature of their
breach of duty (if any), and whether they are exculpated from liability for that breach, can vary for each
director.”)); Steinman v. Levine, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, 2002 WL 31761252, *15 n.81 (Del. Ch. Nov.
27, 2002) (a plaintiff “is required to identify specific acts of individual defendants . . . for his claim to
survive”), aff’d, 822 A.2d 397 (Del. 2003).
150
The idea that some directors could be exonerated while others remained liable was evident in a ruling
in Smith v. Van Gorkom, decided very soon after Aronson. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 899
(denying motion for reargument brought by individual directors complaining that their individual
responsibility was not considered, but only because those directors had made no effort earlier in the case
to present a defense distinct from the rest of the board, even though “a special opportunity was afforded
the individual defendants . . . to present any factual or legal reasons why each or any of them should be
individually treated”).
151
See 250 A.3d at 877, 888-89; _ A.3d at [ ] [2021 WL 4344361, at *7, *16].
152
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d at 934 (“Consistent with the context and rationale of the Aronson
decision, a court should not apply the Aronson test for demand futility where the board that would be
considering the demand did not make a business decision which is being challenged in the derivative suit.
This situation would arise in three principal scenarios: (1) where a business decision was made by a board
of a company, but a majority of the directors making the decision have been replaced . . . .).
153
See id.
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an approach resting on the sound intuition that when the independent directors have voting
control of the board room they have more freedom for impartial action.154 The different test in
Rales is explained by the demand board’s different responsibility for the transaction under
litigation challenge and its effect on the board’s ability to consider a demand.
This difference has important implications in the history of and rationale for Aronson’s
second prong. Aronson was decided at a time when the concept of an “independent director”
was still nascent, and when there was debate about whether the concept had meaning. Some felt
that the natural relationship of fellow directors created a structural bias, and that led to
skepticism that even putatively independent directors could impartially decide whether to sue a
fellow director. Aronson took note of this debate and the second prong helped to ameliorate this
concern by giving a plaintiff two routes to demand excusal. The first was to plead that a
majority of the demand board had ties to the interested party that compromised their ability to
consider a demand to sue. But even if a plaintiff could not satisfy that first route, Aronson’s
second prong gave the plaintiff a chance to get a merits adjudication by pleading particularized
facts supporting an inference that the demand board had made a decision that involved a breach
of fiduciary duty. When a plaintiff made this difficult showing, Aronson’s intuition was that
demand should be excused because it was difficult to presume credibly that a board could sue the
interested parties to a transaction the demand board had approved. Aronson thus took into
account both the reality of how difficult it is to sue a fellow director (structural bias) and that
suing someone else over a decision that you also approved is at the very least exceedingly

154

See, e.g., Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 192-93 (Del. Ch. 2005) (deciding
not to “disturb [the] decision” of the “majority of the disinterested and independent directors”); Air Prods.
& Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc, 16 A.3d 48, 123 (Del. Ch. 2011) (finding the reasonableness of a board
defense of a poison pill because a board majority of independent directors sought to defend it); Unocal,
493 A.2d at 955 (giving enhanced credit to defensive decisions of a board comprised of an independent
majority).

-50-

awkward, and involves some degree of hypocrisy. Without addressing this rationale, and the
difference between the contexts of Aronson and Rales, Zuckerberg eliminated the historical
function of Aronson’s second prong as a safety valve.
3.

The Conflicting Rationales of Zuckerberg and Cases Extending the Reach
of MFW.

The Zuckerberg opinions also create a stark contradiction with the inherent coercion
rationale underlying what we call MFW creep. The Chancery decision took the view set forth in
EZCORP that a transaction with a controller cannot be subject to business judgment rule review
unless the full suite of MFW protections is used.155 For the abandoned transaction that Chancery
focused on, that did not occur. As important, Chancery found that the pled facts supported an
inference that a special committee member faced a disloyalty claim for engaging in friendly
communications with Mr. Zuckerberg that helped him in his negotiations with the special
committee.156 Furthermore, Chancery found that the pled facts suggested that the special
committee was not assertive in responding to Mr. Zuckerberg’s proposal, and the resulting
transaction they approved was not fair to Facebook.157 Thus, the Court of Chancery clearly
found that the particularized facts supported an inference that Mr. Zuckerberg and one special
committee member had breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty, and that the special committee
had failed to assure fair terms.158 Thus, although EZCORP presumes that even a properly
motivated and assertive special committee cannot effectively check a controller and invoke the
business judgment rule, Zuckerberg takes the view that the same directors who approved the
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250 A.3d at 894 (“the Reclassification did not follow the template set out in Kahn v. M & F
Worldwide, Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), so entire fairness would remain the operative standard of
review.”).
156
250 A.3d at 893; see also Zuckerberg, - A.3d at [ ] [2021 WL 4344361 at *4].
157
See Zuckerberg, 250 A.3d at 893-94; see also Zuckerberg, _ A.3d at [ ] [2021 WL 4344361, at *4].
158
250 A.2d at 893.
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challenged transaction can make the more difficult decision to cause the company to sue the
controller (and the special committee member alleged to have cast his lot with the controller).
We respectfully submit, however, that this approach to Aronson ignores the continuing
utility of Aronson’s second prong as an integrity-enhancing safeguard. Properly applied,
Aronson’s second prong allows a plaintiff to plead facts suggesting that, despite the presence of a
majority of independent disinterested directors and the use of facially adequate procedures, there
was a fiduciary breach resulting in harm to the company. This safety valve exists precisely
because of the potential for structural bias where (contrary to the assumption underlying
Rales159) a majority of the demand board approved the business decision under attack in the
derivative action. At the same time, by precluding claims, never presented to the board for
consideration, when the plaintiff cannot meet either of its two tests, Aronson avoids burdening
stockholders with the systemic costs of litigation and judicial second-guessing of matters on
which elected directors, not courts, have the ultimate say.
4.

The Effect of Abandoning Aronson’s Second Prong.

In most conflict transaction cases, the independent directors fulfill the important role of
acting as a proxy for third-party bargaining. If the well pled facts support an inference that they
failed to fulfill that role, not because of conscious disloyalty but because they did not act with
due care, then their actions should have no cleansing effect. and entire fairness review should
apply. That situation is the one the second prong was designed to address, giving effect to the
intuition that even where a board majority is independent of an interested party, structural bias
might make it difficult for the directors to sue a colleague. That intuition also accords with
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Tilray, 2021 Del. Ch. LEXIS 111, at *40 (quoting Rales, 634 A.2d at 934).
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Delaware cases recognizing that it is easier to say no to a colleague on a conflicted transaction
than to sue him.160
The Supreme Court suggested in Zuckerberg161 that the well-reasoned decision by
Chancellor Chandler in McPadden v. Sidhu was an outlier. We respectfully disagree: McPadden
gave traditional and literal effect to Aronson’s second prong.162 In that case, the company had
sold a subsidiary to an officer for $3 million. Two years later the officer sold the subsidiary for
$25 million. The plaintiffs alleged that the independent directors had breached their fiduciary
duties by failing to oversee a proper sale process, by allowing the officer himself to conduct the
sale process despite knowing he was an interested bidder, and then approving the sale to him at
the low end of the valuation range.163 Finding that the particularized pled facts supported a nonexculpated claim against the officer that his loyalty breach was facilitated by the other directors’
gross negligence, the court denied the motion to dismiss under Aronson’s second prong, but
dismissed the independent directors against whom no non-exculpated claim was pled under Rule
12(b)(6), leaving the officer who faced a non-exculpated loyalty claim as the sole defendant.164
Although the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged in Zuckerberg that McPadden was
“understandable … given the plain language of Aronson,” it did not follow that plain language.
Instead, the court abandoned the McPadden approach, finding that the second prong of Aronson
is not satisfied unless the plaintiff pleads facts showing that a majority of the directors face a
non-exculpated claim. This implies that a special committee or independent board majority can
impartially consider a demand to sue the controller over a transaction that the committee or
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E.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 940 (Del. Ch. 2003); Marchand v. Barnhill,
212 A.3d at 820 & n.95.
161
[ ] A.3d at [] [2021 WL 4344361 at *15]
162
McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008).
163
Id. at 1271-72.
164
Id. at 1270-75.
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board majority had approved in a grossly negligent manner.165 At the same time, however, the
law as articulated in EZCorp and other recent Chancery decisions presumes that independent
directors are not capable of standing up to a controller and acting as an effective countervailing
negotiating and approval authority in a conflict transaction. The resulting conflict of views about
the capability of independent directors leaves Delaware law taking the Kafkaesque position of
allowing allegedly careless directors to block a lawsuit over a transaction that would otherwise
be unfailingly subject to judicial review for substantive fairness.166
5.

Creating Incentives to Characterize Director Conduct as in Bad Faith.

Another drawback of Zuckerberg‘s elimination of Aronson’s second prong is that it
pressures well-meaning trial judges to excuse demand by inferring that independent directors
with no apparent motive to be disloyal consciously abetted overreaching by an interested party.
A recent case In Re CBS Corp.167 adopted that approach, holding that demand was excused
because the members of the special committee who negotiated and approved the transaction,
despite being independent from the controller, were subject to a claim of disloyalty because their
efforts were considered ineffective and their acceptance of some of the controller’s demands that
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Lenois, at *5; Zuckerberg, 250 A.3d at 888-89.
The inherent complexities of demand excusal doctrine can result in confusion. For example, cases
under Caremark have been cited in favor of a reading of Aronson’s second prong that requires a showing
that a majority of the demand board face non-exculpated claims. But in Caremark cases, the plaintiff
must by definition plead a non-exculpated claim to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) by virtue of the
Caremark standard itself. E.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003). In these situations, the
plaintiff tends to either state a non-exculpated claim against the entire board or no defendant at all. This
is different from the core type of issue traditionally the focus of most derivative suits, cases challenging
an interested transaction that involves a self-dealing conflict by some directors but that was approved by
others. To hold in such cases that the independent directors can impartially sue the interested party, but
cannot be trusted to say no to him in the first instance strikes us an inconsistency Emerson would not
defend.
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In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Derivative Litig., No. 2020-0111-JRS, 2021 Del. Ch. LEXIS
12, *75 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2021).
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they had earlier rebuffed suggested conscious wrongdoing.168 Remarkably, this decision came
soon after a decision refusing to dismiss a claim that the same transaction was unfair to the
stockholders of the other party to the merger.169 In both decisions, the special committee
defendants failed to win dismissal despite having qualified advisors, a lengthy process, and no
apparent disloyal motive, because the merger — a zero sum transaction — was, as a matter of
pled facts, so unfair to both companies (simultaneously) as to permit an inference that the
special committee members were not just grossly ineffective, but also conscious facilitators of
unfairness.170
The incentives created under Zuckerberg’s new reading of Aronson to question the
motives of independent directors in this fashion and subject them to claims of disloyalty are
troublesome because that exposure to litigation and reputational damage would give any rational
director reason to be cautious about serving on a special committee.171 It is one thing for a court
to infer that a special committee without ties to a controller, and with qualified advisors, fell
short of the mark in securing a fair transaction. It is quite another thing for the law to put the
onus on the court to infer knowing complicity by the independent directors, just to ensure the
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Id. at *105. (“The extreme set of facts before the Court—the CBS Committee members’ behavior that
stood in stark contrast to the conduct of similarly situated fiduciaries confronting nearly identical
circumstances less than a year before, combined with the documented evidence of Ms. Redstone’s dogged
determination to make this deal happen ‘one way or the other’—suffice to state with particularity that
each of the CBS Committee members breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by approving the patently
unfair Merger in order to appease Ms. Redstone.”)
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In re Viacom Inc. S’holders Litig., Consolidated C.A. 2019-0948-JRS, 2020 WL 7711128, at *18
(Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2020).
170
In CBS (the latter of the two opinions) the court acknowledged the oddity that stockholders of both
merging companies could viably contend that the merger was unfair to both companies simultaneously.
CBS, 2021 Del. Ch. LEXIS 12, at *6.
171
See Cornerstone, 115 A.3d at 1184-85 (“We decline to adopt an approach that would create incentives
for independent directors to avoid serving as special committee members, or to reject transactions solely
because their role in negotiating on behalf of the stockholders would cause them to remain as defendants
until the end of any litigation challenging the transaction.”). (internal citations omitted).
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interested party is held accountable. Under the traditional and literal reading of Aronson, this
perverse incentive did not exist.
The better way to address the potential for meritless litigation and to restore coherence to
doctrine is not to undermine the credibility-reinforcing role of Aronson’s second prong. Rather,
the business judgment rule principles upon which Aronson rested should be reinvigorated to give
appropriate effect to the traditional protective devices, and to then use the second prong to permit
cases to proceed where a plaintiff can plead with particularity a non-exculpated claim against any
defendant. That result would require acknowledging that McPadden was correctly decided, but
would not require doctrinal contortion: the court could simply add a fourth element to the threepart demand futility test it adopted in Zuckerberg,172 excusing demand where the well pled facts
indicate that a majority of the directors acted with gross negligence in approving a transaction
with a controlling stockholder.
6.

Accepting Zuckerberg’s Policy Choice Requires Rejecting the Resurgence
of the Inherent Coercion Doctrine.

Zuckerberg represents at bottom an important new policy choice of Delaware’s corporate
common law, and cannot be rationalized on the ground that the logic of Aronson’s second prong
has somehow been undermined by developments since the case was decided. As we have
shown, that is not so, and properly understood, Aronson’s second prong acts as a check on
structural bias by recognizing the difficulty directors have in suing colleague over a decision the
same directors approved in the first place and requiring a judicial adjudication of a breach of
fiduciary duty claim when the plaintiffs can meet a higher particularized pleading standard
demonstrating a rational inference of an ultimate breach of duty causing harm to the company.
This balance, requiring plaintiffs to make a stronger showing than required to survive a 12(b)(6)
172

[ ] A.3d at [ ] [2021 WL4344361 at *17].
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motion, but then excusing demand so that a claim that meets that demanding pleading
requirement can be decided by a court on its merits, rather than gated by the board that approved
the very decision under challenge, is one that remains a rational way to ensure the integrity of
Delaware corporate law, while not undermining the principle that in most situations the board
determines whether a corporation brings a claim belonging to the corporation.
If Zuckerberg is to be justified as a stable doctrine, then it must rest on acceptance of the
actual policy choice that underlies it, which is that if a majority of the directors who approved a
transaction that particularized facts suggest was tainted by a breach of fiduciary duty do not
themselves face a risk of monetary liability, they can impartially decide to cause the company to
sue the interested parties who do face that risk. That is a policy decision that no change in
intervening law requires to have been made, and represents instead a belief that even when
making the most difficult decision a director could make — to sue a fellow fiduciary over a
transaction that the independent director approved in the first instance — Delaware law
presumes impartiality.
Although we favor the balance struck by Aronson’s second prong, we recognize that
Zuckerberg’s different policy choice is defensible given the multiple accountability forces that
work to hold corporate boards faithful, and independent directors in particular vigilant. But, if
Zuckerberg’s policy direction is to be embraced, it must be embraced in a coherent manner. We
have no doubt that it is much easier for a parent or friend to discourage a young adult from
smoking a joint when that is illegal, or from drinking and driving before they engage in that
behavior, than it would be to turn that young adult in to the police if they failed to heed the
warning. And if the parent or friend condoned the behavior in the first instance, we think it even
more doubtful that they could decide impartially to report the violation to the police.
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Delaware law has previously recognized that for directors, it is therefore easier for them
to act as a check on wrongdoing or overreaching in the first instance, and thus to say no to a selfdealing transaction as a member of the special committee if the terms are not fair, than it would
be to sue a fellow fiduciary over a transaction after the fact, especially given that they had
approved that transaction in the first place.173 For these reasons, if Zuckerberg is to form a
durable part of a coherent body of corporate law, restricting Lynch’s inherent coercion concept,
limiting the application of MFW to going private transactions, and permitting the use of any of
the traditional protective provisions with fidelity to cleanse other interested transactions is
necessary if the premises on which fiduciary duty law rests are to be consistent and rational. If
independent directors who the particularized facts suggest approved an unfair transaction by
ineffectively failing to check the interested party’s self-interest are presumed capable of
impartially suing, then certainly independent directors advised by qualified advisors should be
presumed capable of effectively negotiating for fair terms and their conduct should invoke the
business judgment rule. If Zuckerberg signals the beginning of an alignment toward greater
respect for the traditional protective measures and toward a confinement of MFW to its originally
intended narrow function, then we view that development with more optimism. If, by contrast,
Zuckerberg’s policy choice co-exists with MFW creep, then Delaware law will rest on
contradictory assumptions about director conduct, and will invite criticism for subjecting certain
claims to tighter judicial review, while using a change in demand excusal law to render that
review illusory in the important context of derivative claims.
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See Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 134 (Del. 2016) (“Causing a lawsuit to be brought against another
person is no small matter, and is the sort of thing that might plausibly endanger a relationship.”).
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E.

Eliminating the Vestigial Waste Claim After Disinterested Stockholder Vote.

Function Over Form noted that even an arm’s length transaction approved by a fully
independent board, or a conflict transaction approved by one of the traditional cleansing
protections, cannot be sustained if it constitutes waste. This potential claim serves an
important function where a transaction has not been approved, on full information, by the
disinterested stockholders. Where only directors approve a transaction, the waste inquiry
serves as a forensic device to ferret out possible covert disloyalty. If, despite approval of
the transaction by independent directors, a plaintiff pleads facts supporting an inference
that the transaction is so unfair to the corporation that its terms could not be approved as
fair by a rational person, the case will go forward.
This safety valve has no logical role, however, where fully informed, disinterested
stockholders have voted to approve the transaction.174 Where the parties with money at
stake have made the assessment that the transaction is favorable to the corporation, how,
our courts have long asked, can the transaction be considered waste? The logical answer
supplied by Function Over Form was that it could not be, and several Chancery cases later
concurred.175 It is now time to limit the waste safety valve to transactions that were not the
subject of a vote by the disinterested stockholders.
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Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1318 (citing Criden v. Steinberg, C.A. No. 17082, 2000 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 50, at *9-*15 (Del. Ch. March 23, 2000)); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d
879, 895-902 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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Tornetta v. Musk, 250 A.3d at 814-15 (dismissing waste claim where an informed stockholder vote
approved the challenged decision); In re Volcano S’holder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 749-50 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(same); Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151-52 (Del. 2016) (the waste exception to informed,
uncoerced votes has no “real-world relevance” because disinterested stockholders would not approve a
wasteful transaction).
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F.

Eliminating the Orwellian Doctrine of “Substantive Coercion”

Function Over Form argued that the parentalistic doctrine of substantive coercion176
should not be expanded into the electoral context by allowing directors to argue that the
stockholders might hurt themselves if, on a fully informed basis, they disbelieved the incumbent
boards’ view that it would be harmful to unseat them.177 Several years earlier, the Delaware
Supreme Court had employed the doctrine of substantive coercion to justify the reasonableness
of the Time board’s decision to revise a merger agreement so as to avoid a stockholder vote and
push through a deal it preferred to a lucrative non-coercive tender offer that the market valued
much higher.178 The Time board maintained that there was a danger that the stockholders would
ignore the board’s belief that its preferred transaction, a merger with Warner, would offer more
value in the long run than the huge premium offered by Paramount.179 Holding that that the
Time board’s fundamental reshaping of the transaction to avoid a stockholder vote was
reasonable — despite it involving a much higher cost to Time and larger debt than the original
form of the merger that required a stockholder vote – the court held that substantive coercion was
a legitimate threat.180 Moreover, the court characterized substantive coercion as qualitatively
different from the threat that the Paramount offer was inadequate.181
That ruling was made in the context of dictum criticizing factually unrelated decisions of
the Court of Chancery, in particular Interco,182 which held that a board could not use a poison
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The substantive coercion concept was originally articulated in Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is there Substance to Proportionality Review?,
44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989).
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Function Over Form, supra note 4, at 1316 n.111.
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Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1153 n.17.
179
Id. at 1144-45.
180
Id. at 1154.
181
Id. at 1153 n.17.
182
See City Cap. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799-800 (Del. Ch. 1988) ( using a
poison pill to “deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose to accept a noncoercive offer, after
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pill to block a non-coercive tender offer indefinitely, but only for a period of time necessary to
generate alternatives, bargain for a higher bid, and give stockholders information about the
merits of the board’s position.183 In essence, Time-Warner used a non-pill case to hold that
under Unocal a board could use a pill preclude a non-coercive tender offer with a pill.184 In
reality, that was a power allocation decision, cloaked in the guise of a pejorative description of
the non-coercive offer as being “substantively coercive.”185
As has been explained elsewhere,186 this use of substantive coercion was alien to the
intentions of the academics who created it, and is confusing and unhelpful, for a host of reasons
that need not be repeated here. In all stockholder votes, there is the potential that stockholders
might make a mistake. Delaware law has historically, however, given weight to the decisions of
those whose equity capital is at stake, so long as they were fully informed.187

the board has had a reasonable opportunity to explore or create alternatives, or attempt to negotiate on the
shareholders’ behalf, would … be so inconsistent with widely shared notions of appropriate corporate
governance as to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and authority of our corporation law.” ).
183
For a more complete discussion, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Story of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.:
Keeping the Electoral Path to Takeovers Clear, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 286-87 (J. Mark Ramseyer
ed., 2009) [hereinafter The Story of Blasius].
184
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
185
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1153 n.17; The Story of Blasius, supra note 183, at 287. The Supreme Court
later employed the substantive coercion doctrine to the same end in Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385.
186
See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s Retrospective,
5 HARV. BUS. LAW. REV. 141, 164-166 (2015); The Story of Blasius, supra note 183, at 274, 287-90;
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 324-30 (Del. Ch. 2000); Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. Airgas,
16 A.3d at 57, 97-101.
187
Unitrin held that a target board could use a pill and a repurchase plan that increased insider voting
power and made a proxy fight more difficult because of the threat of substantive coercion, but then held a
proxy fight for board control was viable because the company had so many institutional investors with a
motivation to get the best value, stating no company was more susceptible to a proxy fight over a matter
of money. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1383, 1389-91. The two parts do not cohere. Chesapeake Corp., 771
A.2d at 326 (describing Unitrin as cognitively dissonant, because “[o]n the one hand, a corporate
electorate highly dominated by institutional investors has the motivation and wherewithal to understand
and act [on proxy and tender offer disclosures by a hostile bidder]. On the other, the same electorate must
be protected from substantive coercion because it…is unable to digest management’s position on the
long-term value of the company….”).
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If Delaware law wishes to allow boards to take the decision about a non-coercive tender
offer out of the hands of stockholders if a board reasonably believes the offer is too low, the
Delaware Supreme Court should just say so, as the Court of Chancery suggested in this key
footnote to its important Airgas decision:
Our law would be more credible if the Supreme Court
acknowledged that its later rulings have modified Moran and have
allowed a board acting in good faith (and with a reasonable basis
for believing that a tender offer is inadequate) to remit the bidder
to the election process as its only recourse. The tender offer [in
this case] is in fact precluded and the only bypass is electing a new
board. If that is the law, it would be best to be honest and abandon
the pretense that preclusive action is per se unreasonable.188
Allowing boards to block non-coercive bids may or not be wise, and we think Interco
adopted the rule most respectful of Moran’s189 original promise that pills would be reviewed
carefully for reasonableness in the heat of battle.190 But at the least, Delaware takeover law
should candidly rely on the view that it is within the board’s authority to block a non-coercive
bid, and not rest on a twisted misuse of the Orwellian concept of substantive coercion.
G.

Amending Section 102(b)(7) to Exculpate Officers for Breaches of Duty
1.

Origins of Section 102(b)(7) and the Unavailability of Officer Exculpation
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Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, 16 A.3d at122 n.480.
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57.
190
We recognize that market dynamics (e.g., the rising power of institutions and independent directors,
and the corresponding decline in classified boards and pills) have generally made takeover bids more
viable than ever. The incidence of classified/staggered boards and poison pills has sharply declined. See
Robert Daines, Shelley Xin Li, and Charles C.Y. Wang, Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Causal
Evidence from Massachusetts 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-105, 2021) (“[T]he number of
Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) companies with an SB has declined by 82% during 2000–2020….”)
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/06/the-return-of-poison-pills-a-first-look-at-crisis-pills/
S, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dealtalk-poisonpills/poison-pills-drop-to-lowest-level-in-20-yearsidUSTRE62T5D320100330; see also Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law
Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1655 (2011) (describing successful attempts of activist
shareholders to curtail the use of poison pills).
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After Van Gorkom191 and the controversy it caused, the Delaware General Corporation
Law enacted § 102(b)(7), which authorized corporate certificate provisions eliminating director
monetary liability for breach of the duty of care.192 Motivated by an ongoing crisis in the market
for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance that Van Gorkom exacerbated,193 the Delaware
General Assembly enacted § 102(b)(7) to counteract the prohibitive expense (and in some cases,
unavailability) of traditional D&O insurance policies for corporate boards.194 Notably, the new
legislation did not include corporate officers among those eligible for the liability exclusion
authorized by § 102(b)(7).
The drafters of § 102(b)(7) explicitly considered whether to permit elimination of
monetary liability for officers.195 Those favoring affording corporate officers the same
protections as directors asserted that the drafters “might be perceived of doing too little” if they
did not grant to officers the possibility of immunity, and that because officers and directors were
treated similarly for purposes of liability there was no need “to draw a distinction between
them.”196
That position did not prevail, however. The majority of the drafting committee first
contended that monetary liability for officers for breach of the duty of care would serve as a
191

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
See DEL CODE ANN. Tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2020).
193
Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 23 (1989) (“Van Gorkom, . . . was decided in 1985 after the insurance crisis was well under
way.”).
194
Synopsis of §102(b)(7), 65 Del. Laws, c. 289, §§ 1-2 (1986) (accessible at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7665-1986sb333pdf.); see also Memorandum from David B.
Brown, Secretary, Council of Corp. L. Section of the Delaware State Bar Ass’n 1-2 (May 6, 1986)
(accessible at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6891-a.).
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See Meeting Minutes from David B. Brown, Secretary, Council of Corp. L. Section of the Delaware
State Bar Ass’n, to A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Chairman, Council of Corp. L. Section of the Delaware State
Bar Ass’n 2-4 (Apr. 28, 1986) (“Much of the discussion focused on whether [Section 102(b)(7)] should
apply to officers as well as directors . . . .”) (accessible at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6685-ahreflivefiles6685-860423-council-minutespdf.).
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Id. at 2.
192
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disciplining mechanism, encouraging them to bring difficult or troubling matters to the board for
resolution.197 That majority also noted that “there was no pressing need for protection” of
officers because jurisdiction over them could not be obtained in Delaware.198 At that time,
Delaware’s long-arm statute (§ 3114)199 permitted jurisdiction over corporate directors, but not
officers.200 Even recognizing that § 3114 could later be extended to officers, the drafters decided
to study the matter further,201 but they never returned to address this concern.
This history suggests that if § 3114 had provided for jurisdiction over corporate officers
in 1986, the question of whether to exculpate officers may have been resolved differently.202 In
any event, nothing in the statute’s history suggests that the drafters excluded officers because
they intended to expose them to vastly different liability to stockholder plaintiffs for transactions
that the board approved.
2.

Post-102(b)(7) Developments in Personal Jurisdiction of Officers

In 2004, eighteen years after § 102(b)(7) was enacted, the Delaware General Assembly
amended § 3114 to provide personal jurisdiction over principal corporate officers, as some of the
drafters had foreseen.203 The decision to extend jurisdiction to officers—thereby enabling them
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Id.; see also University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, 102(b)(7): A. Gilchrist Sparks Interview,
YOUTUBE, at 46:52 (Apr. 20, 2018) [hereinafter A. Gilchrist Sparks III Interview],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jsvFzYqPjHQ (“[B]y not extending [Section 102(b)(7)] to officers,
you would cause officers to do what they ought to do on sticky problems and bring them to the attention
of the board, so they could be dealt with it at that level.”).
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David B. Brown, supra note 194, at 3.
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DEL CODE ANN. Tit. 10 § 3114 (2020).
200
David B. Brown, supra note 194, at 3.
201
Id. The Council’s view was blinkered because plaintiffs could likely secure personal jurisdiction over
officers in the corporation’s headquarters state. That said, it was natural for the Council to focus on the
ability of stockholders to sue officers in Delaware, which is often preferred by plaintiffs as a more neutral
forum than the company’s hometown.
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See A. Gilchrist Sparks III Interview, supra note 197 at 45:35 (“at that point in time [§ 3114] did not
give you long-arm jurisdiction over officers, so it wasn’t customary to see officers named in lawsuits, and
some found that to be a reason why not to extend [§ 102(b)(7)] to officers, because it wasn’t necessary.”)
(emphasis added).
203
DEL CODE. ANN. Tit. 10 § 3114(b) (2020).
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to be sued in derivative and class actions—was not inspired by concerns that the threat of
monetary liability was necessary to motivate officers to exercise care. Rather, that decision was
a response to high-salience developments in corporate governance that exposed a gap in
addressing concerns about officer loyalty.204
In response to scandals involving fraud within companies like Enron and WorldCom, the
federal government and institutions including the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ
initiated a panoply of reforms designed to increase public confidence in the integrity of
American corporations.205 These reforms, which included the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
listing requirements for the major stock exchanges, caused many corporations to increase
significantly the percentage of independent directors sitting on their boards,206 thereby reducing
the presence of management directors in the boardroom.207
Although these reforms and the heightened use of independent directors garnered
widespread praise,208 the reduced presence of officer-directors created a “practical problem” for
Delaware’s ability to hold top officers accountable for fiduciary disloyalty:209 because § 3114
only applied to corporate directors, Delaware courts lacked personal jurisdiction over key non-
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See generally, William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
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L. REV. 953 (2003).
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director officers, like those responsible for fraud in infamous scandals at companies such as
Enron.210 The General Assembly reacted by amending § 3114 to grant jurisdiction over key
officers even if they were not directors.211 That reaction arose not out of a concern that officers
would fail to exercise care and needed to be held accountable, but in response to a national
corporate crisis resulting from flagrant violations of the duty of loyalty by officers who might not
otherwise be subject to Delaware jurisdiction.
3.

Current Derivative and Class Action Litigation Against Officers

Not long after the amendment to § 3114, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized what
the drafters of § 102(b)(7) had kept in mind a generation earlier:212 namely, that the fiduciary
duties of corporate officers should generally be measured by the same principles as those
applicable to corporate directors.213 Because of their exclusion from § 102(b)(7), however,
corporate officers inhabit a very different litigation landscape than directors.
Because of the amendment to § 3114, stockholder plaintiffs now have an unhealthy and
unfair incentive for stockholder plaintiffs to single out officers for due care claims. Because
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most public companies have boards with super-majorities of independent directors, plaintiffs are
often unable to plead that a majority of the board has any self-interest in approving a suboptimal
third-party transaction. With the independent directors therefore insulated from damages for a
due care breach, plaintiffs have resorted to naming one or more non-director officers as
defendants in suits challenging what was essentially a collective board decision.214 And because
a care claim against an officer or two who lack protection under § 102(b)(7) will survive a
motion to dismiss, and trigger discovery that will generate most of the same costs as if the other
directors were being sued, the stratagem of suing officers provides significant settlement
leverage.215
This situation is not justifiable. The concern about fiduciary responsibility of officers,
whether board members or not, has never been about due care, because officers have little
incentive to be neglectful, certainly not at the gross level that Van Gorkom recognized as
necessary to support liability.216 The realistic concern is about loyalty: fiduciaries whose
livelihoods are tied to full time employment at the corporation might be more susceptible to
conflicts of interest when an opportunity attractive to stockholders (e.g., a strategic acquisition)
could endanger their employment.
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See, e.g., City of Warren Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys., v. Roche, No. 2019-0740-PAF, 2020 WL 7023896, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020) (alleging violations of the duty of care by the CEO and Executive Chairman
after a unanimous board of directors, with ten of the twelve officers independent, approved a buyout); In
re Baker Hughes Inc. Merger Litig., No. 2019-0638-AGB, 2020 WL 6281427, at *1, *6 (Del. Ch. Oct.
27, 2020) (alleging violations of the duty of care by the CEO and President—two officer-directors—with
plaintiff conceding that at least twelve members of the thirteen-member board were independent
directors); Morrison v. Berry, No. 12808-VCG, 2019 WL 7369431 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2019) (denying
motion to dismiss claim that chief legal officer violated his duty of care in connection with corporate
disclosures); Chen v. Howard-Anderson 87 A.3d 648, 686-87 (Del. Ch. 2014) (alleging sales process
claim against CFO and CEO-director).
215
See, e.g., Olenik v. Lodzinski, 208 A.3d 704, 719 n.74 (Del. 2019) (targeting CEO-director to plead a
non-exculpated claim and avoid dismissal); Voigt v. Metcalf, No. 2018-0828-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS
55, at *69-70 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2020) (same).
216
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
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Although loyalty, not care, is the fundamental fiduciary concern, officers are being
targeted with due care claims because plaintiffs cannot plead a loyalty claim against either them
or the board. The unfairness of this strategy is accentuated by the realities that: (a) senior
managers are subject to frequent replacement;217 (b) analyst and investor scrutiny has never been
more intense;218 and (c) independent directors dominate most public boards, and private
company managers typically are under pressure to perform and have no reason to lack
diligence.219
Nevertheless, due care claims targeting officers are the latest result of the shareholder
plaintiffs’ bar’s efforts to develop litigation tactics that offer potentially lucrative fee awards in
the M&A field, especially given the decline of multi-forum litigation220 and appraisal
proceedings221 and rulings acknowledging that an informed, uncoerced stockholder vote
implicates the business judgment rule and warrants dismissal at the pleading stage.222 One would
think that such claims would be rare because independent boards are fulfilling the goals of
advocates of an unfettered market for corporate control, by selling the company at a premium
after appropriate market checks. But, because these claims are considered “direct” rather than
derivative, no procedural obstacle to the plaintiffs’ ability to sue exists. If a plaintiff can state
any viable claim against any defendant, the suit proceeds to expensive, time consuming
217

E.g, Per-Ola Karlsson, Martha Turner, and Peter Gassman, Succeeding the Long-Serving Legend in the
Corner Office, STRATEGY+BUSINESS, May 15, 2019, https://www.strategybusiness.com/article/Succeeding-the-long-serving-legend-in-the-corner-office?gko=90171 (“Turnover
among CEOs at the world’s 2,500 largest companies soared to a record high of 17.5 percent in 2018”).
218
See Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter Amendments, 43 J. CORP. L. 289, 290-91
(2017) (discussing the rise in shareholder activity and management responsiveness to their desires);
Gordon, supra note 89, at 1509 (addressing the increased role of analysts).
219
Gordon, supra note 89, at 1476; Bhagat & Black, supra note 96, at 924.
220
E.g., ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, supra note 83.
221
See William J. Carney & Keith Sharfman, The Death of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending Windfalls for
Deal Dissenters, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 61 (2018). Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Asking the Right
Question: The Statutory Right of Appraisal and Efficient Markets, 74 BUS. LAW. 1015 (2019).
222
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).

-68-

discovery, and gives the plaintiff’s lawyers leverage to extract a settlement and its accompanying
attorneys’ fee.
The duty of care claims asserted in these cases are highly problematic: plaintiffs accuse
officer(s) or officer-director(s) of gross negligence in executing their responsibilities as an
officer, most commonly because of their role in preparing the disclosures about the transaction in
connection with the stockholder vote.223 In cases where the targeted officer is also a director but
is charged with carrying out a transaction qua officer, different Chancery judges have arguably
applied seemingly inconsistent standards to determine in which capacity the individual allegedly
acted.224 Targeting non-director officers avoids that uncertainty, and is the most attractive
strategy for plaintiffs because these officers cannot argue that they acted as directors and are
therefore subject to exculpation.225 Either way, disclosure claims against officers (whether board
members or not) have proven an effective way for plaintiffs to increase the settlement value of
their lawsuits.226

223

See, e.g., Pattern Energy, 2021 WL 1812674, at *69-70 (alleging duty of care claims against officers
in sale of company); In re Mindbody, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 2019-0442-KSJM, 2020 WL 5870084, at
*32 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020) (alleging duty of care claim against CEO/COO for acting in grossly negligent
manner throughout sale process); In re Coty S’holder Litig., No. 2019-0336-AGB, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS
269 at *21-22 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2020) (discussing plaintiff’s duty of care claim against defendants
officer-directors for their allegedly negligent preparation of sale documents); Voigt v. Metcalf, 2020 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 55, at *65-66 (alleging duty of care claim against defendants officer-directors for their
advocation of a challenged transaction to board); Morrison v. Berry, No. 12802-VCG, 2019 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 1412, at *56, *71 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2019) (discussing duty of care claims against the CEO and
the general counsel for role in negotiating sale of company).
224
Compare Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City v. Presidio, Inc., 251 A.3d at 283 (looking
to the “primary role” of the CEO-director in the transaction to determine whether he acted as officer or
director) with Coty S’holders Litig., 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 269, at *21-22 (looking to whether the officerdirector merely “could have” breached his duties in his capacity as an officer), and Voigt, 2020 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 55, at *69 (applying same standard).
225
See, e.g., In re Baker Hughes Inc., Merger Litig., No. 2019-0638-AGB, 2020 WL 6281427 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 27, 2020); Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d at 686-87.
226
Plaintiffs are, of course, not always successful. See, e.g., In re AmTrust Fin. Servs., No. 2018-0396AGB, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 74, *at 36-7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2020) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims against
CEO-director because the complaint lacked information about which actions were taken exclusively in his
officer capacity) in capacity as officer); In re Essendant, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 2018-0789-JRS, 2019
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Several recent cases featuring due care claims against officers and officer-directors
illustrate their perverse consequences:
•

Preserving vestigial care claims after loyalty claims are dismissed:
In City of Warren General Employees’ Retirement System v. Roche, the target

company’s board and nearly all of its stockholders approved a merger with two private
equity companies. The plaintiff sued only the CEO-President and Executive Chairman, two
officer-directors, in their capacities as officers, but did not assert any claims against any of
the other directors.227 The plaintiff alleged that those officers breached their duty of loyalty
by (1) manipulating the board of directors to favor the buyout from the private equity firms,
rather than an activist stockholder, in order to secure their own employment, and (2)
producing a materially misleading proxy statement.228 The court concluded that the
complaint failed to state a claim that the officer-directors violated their duty of loyalty.229
Nevertheless, the court determined that the plaintiff adequately pled a non-exculpable claim
that the CEO-President breached his duty of care in preparing the proxy statement.230 As a
result, only a single officer-director remained potentially liable, solely for lack of due care
in his capacity as an officer. Even though the principal concern was that the officers had
been disloyal during transactions—a concern that the court determined was not adequately

Del. Ch. LEXIS 1404, at *32-3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2019) (dismissing duty of care claim against CEOdirector because it did not allege facts sufficient to support an inference that the officer-director breached
his duty).
227
Roche, 2020 WL 7023896, at *10 (“In this action, Plaintiff does not assert any claim against any
member of the Board in their capacity as directors. Rather, the Complaint contains a single count alleging
[CEO-President] and [Executive Chairman] breached their fiduciary duties.”).
228
Id. at *1, *10.
229
Id. at *18.
230
Id. at *20, *24. The claim against the other officer-director was dismissed because the plaintiff did not
plead enough about his involvement in creating the proxy statement.
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pled—the plaintiff was able to extract significant settlement leverage because a nonexculpable care claim against one officer survived dismissal.231
•

Inconsistent treatment of similar conduct.
In another recent case,232 officers remained in the suit due to their managerial

positions, but defendants who played at least as important a role in the disputed merger
were exculpated due to their status as directors. Plaintiff claimed that the directors and an
officer of the target company violated their fiduciary duties by not seeking the highest
price.233 The court granted summary judgment in favor of the non-officer defendants on that
claim,234 determining that the company’s 102(b)(7) charter provision exculpated nearly the
entire board,235 but declined to dismiss the CEO-director and the CFO because of their
officer status,236 even though some board members had similar or even greater levels of
involvement as the officer defendants. One non-officer board member fielded, organized,
and reported on the initial calls about the potential merger,237 served as the point of contact
with the acquiror’s CEO,238 spoke with competing bidders,239 and even attended meetings
alone with the CEO-director and the acquiror’s CEO to discuss the final transaction.240

231

A similar situation occurred in Baker Hughes, 2020 WL 6281427 at *2, *21 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 2020)
(dismissing all the claims against defendant except for single claim of a breach of the duty of disclosure
by CEO-director in his capacity as an officer).
232
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014).
233
Id. at 666, 686.
234
Id. at 693. The court denied summary judgment as to a separate proxy disclosure claim because it
could not determine whether the issue was one of loyalty, which would not be exculpable, or care. Id. at
692.
235
Id. (“[B]ecause of the Exculpation Provision, summary judgment is entered on the sale process claims
against the plaintiffs and in favor of defendants [directors].”).
236
Id. at 686-87.
237
See id. at 655 (describing the role of director Steven Kraus).
238
Id.
239
Id. 655-56.
240
Id. at 658.
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Because that director was not an officer, however, he was exculpated, while the CEO and
CFO, who participated at a similar level, were not.
•

Adding claims against officers to prolong tenuous litigation.
In Cirillo Family Trust v. Moezinia,241 the court granted summary judgment

dismissing a disclosure claim because the plaintiff could not establish that any director had
breached their duty of loyalty, and a 102(b)(7) provision precluded liability for any breach
of the duty of care.242 To keep the suit alive, the plaintiff moved for leave to assert a care
claim against two officer-directors.243 Although the court perceived this new claim as
dubious,244 it allowed the amendment because §102(b)(7) did not apply to the officerdefendants in their capacities as officers, and the complaint therefore “identified a
theoretical path to recovery through a due care claim.”245 Merely by tacking on an
additional claim with a low likelihood of recovery, the plaintiff was able to prolong the
litigation and gain leverage to extract a settlement.
4.

The Remedy: Amend Section 102(b)(7)

These developments cry out for a solution. Permitting stockholder plaintiffs to claim that
officers have lapsed in their use of care over a proxy statement drives up litigation and insurance
costs for companies and their stockholders, with little or no compensating benefit.246 The wave

241

No. 10116-CB, 2018 WL 3388398 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2018).
Id. at *10-13.
243
Id. at *18.
244
Id. (“I am highly skeptical that the [plaintiff] ultimately could prevail on this due care theory given the
factual record developed during discovery . . . .”).
245
Id. at *18.
246
The problem is not limited to the context of public companies, where most due care claims are made.
In that context, diversion of profits or other forms of self-dealing are the problem. In such cases, most
claims are derivative, not direct, and it is typically not difficult for a plaintiff to identify an actual conflict
of interest that has driven the decision alleged to be unfair. Most family-owned companies have family
members with real skin in the game and no incentive to harm the business itself by negligence. And, in
242
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of officer-focused due care claims raises another fundamental concern. A core function of the
board of directors is policing the care of its officers. The recent proliferation of due care claims
against officers and officer-directors subverts this function by wresting this key managerial
prerogative from the board. Particularly where such claims are direct and do not require the
plaintiff to make a demand on the board or plead demand excusal, plaintiffs can bypass Rule
23.1’s “stringent requirements of factual particularity”247 to demonstrate demand excusal.
When an independent board majority protected against due care liability approves a
transaction or decision and no loyalty claim stands against any defendant, any damages case
should be dismissed. The disparity of § 102(b)(7)’s coverage, however, has forced the courts to
treat directors and officers differently for conduct devoid of loyalty concerns. This anomaly
should be remedied by amending § 102(b)(7) to provide an option for stockholders to adopt a
charter provision exculpating officers for non-loyalty claims, except for claims brought by the
company itself. That amendment would be consistent with the legislative intent of § 102(b)(7),
and most notably, the drafters’ desire to maintain some liability for officers as a disciplining and
information-forcing mechanism for boards.
Amending § 102(b)(7) in this manner would not, in itself, exculpate anyone. It would
merely authorize private action, leaving the stockholders to decide whether to adopt or buy into a
charter amendment exculpating officers. Stockholders have demonstrated that they can and do
resist governance rules that they consider inappropriate. The market-oriented solution we
propose would enable stockholders to determine whether it is optimal to allow derivative and
class action plaintiffs to bring due care claims against officers.

the large private companies controlled by private equity, the officers are under very tight control, and thus
loyalty again is the main issue, not care.
247
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
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H.

Addressing the Dysfunctional State of Practice Under Section 220

Function Over Form advanced the core claim that the law’s failure to adjust adroitly to
new commercial circumstances can lead to inefficiency and unjustifiable costs to our corporate
governance system. That is true for statutes as well as case law, and in the past two decades, one
form of statutory action has become quite salient and problematic, both in terms of its costs for
litigants and for the Court of Chancery itself: actions seeking books and records under § 220.
For stockholder-plaintiffs, § 220 actions have come to resemble trench warfare rather
than the summary proceeding the statute contemplates. Extending the metaphor, plaintiffs have
been conscripted into battle: the Delaware Supreme Court has admonished plaintiffs to use the
“tools at hand” provided by § 220 before bringing a derivative action in which they must plead
facts supporting an inference that a breach of fiduciary duty has been committed.248
But heeding this advice, plaintiffs have too often met “overly aggressive” responses from
corporate defendants, including arguments having no plausible grounding in the statute or
precedent under it.249 In one high profile case, for example, the plaintiff got the books and
records that the Delaware courts found it was entitled to receive,250 but by that time a derivative
suit brought in the company’s hometown that relied solely on publicly available records had been
dismissed for failure to plead demand excusal.251 That judgment – in a forum that most plaintiffs
would have never used and that was entered against a plaintiff who did not seek books and
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E.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 266-67.
Chancery found this to be the case in two recent decisions and noted that there was a trend of similar
behavior in § 220 cases., Pettry v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 2020 WL 6870461 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2020); Pettry
v. Gilead Scis., Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0132-KSJM, 2021 WL 3087027 (Del. Ch. July 22, 2021).
250
In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Del. Derivative Litig., 167 A.3d 513, 530 (Del. Ch. 2017) (affirming
Chancery judgment granting books and records to plaintiff in § 220 action, when the Chancery had stayed
other pending derivative actions in favor of making lead counsel the firm that sought books and records
before filing a plenary action).
251
Id.
249
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records – was then held to preclude the plaintiff who followed the Delaware courts’ “tools at
hand” admonition from having its better pleaded claim examined on the merits.252 This
anomalous result creates poor incentives, by advantaging plaintiffs who rush into court without
adequate due diligence over those who heed the Delaware courts’ admonition to use § 220 to
develop a complaint resistant to dismissal.
Corporations and their investors have also suffered from a new wave of § 220 demands
and actions against companies whose boards have entered into an agreement to sell the company
at a premium. Stockholders file “placeholder” demands and suits in advance of the deal closing,
for the ostensible purpose of policing the deal for fidelity with fiduciary duty.253 To justify this
stratagem in advance of pending public company merger votes, where documents like proxy
statements and 13e-3 materials are available, plaintiffs have invoked the Supreme Court’s
admonition to use § 220 in the very different context of derivative suits, where typically few if
any public documents are available for plaintiffs to use but particularized facts must be pled to
support demand excusal.254 At times, the Court of Chancery has cited the tools at hand doctrine
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Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824 (Del. 2018) (finding that the dismissal of a
similar Arkansas action — an action in Walmart’s hometown — precluded the Delaware plaintiff who
sought books and records from moving forward with its case).
253
See, e.g., Kosinski v. GGP Inc., 214 A.3d 944 (Del. Ch. 2019) (granting inspection for the purpose of
investigating potential wrongdoing in connection with a merger); Edward B. Micheletti & Bonnie W.
David, Recent Trends in Books and Records Litigation (Jan. 21, 2020), available at
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/01/recent-trends-in-books-and-records-litigation
(“given the marked decrease in M&A injunction requests and the corresponding decrease in discovery
records created for that purpose, stockholder plaintiffs have increasingly turned to Section 220 —
particularly in the merger context — for access to documents in advance of filing post-closing class action
complaints for money damages.”).
254
AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Lebanon Cnty. Emps’ Fund, 243 A.3d 417, 426 (Del. 2020) (“For over a
quarter-century, this Court has repeatedly encouraged stockholders suspicious of a corporation’s
management or operations to exercise this right to obtain the information necessary to meet the
particularization requirements that are applicable in derivative litigation.”).
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in the public company merger context, without examining how different it is from the derivative
suit context in which the admonition originated.255
Seeking to avoid the effect of long-standing Delaware case law that an informed
stockholder vote on a third-party transaction invokes business judgment review and enables
pleading stage dismissal in cases involving third-party mergers, the plaintiffs’ bar claims to need
books and records to plead a claim that the merger proxy was materially misleading. To that end,
a new practice emerged: instead of a plenary action being filed in every deal case,256 companies
doing third-party sales transactions now often face multiple demands for books and records.
This practice is problematic for several reasons. First, these cases seek to support
pleading what we describe as a “non-Revlon Revlon claim,” even where, unlike in Revlon itself,
target boards have employed active market checks and did not erect defenses to any higher bid.
Second, the publicly available information on which to base a direct claim is more robust than
ever, due to the interaction between Delaware corporate case law and SEC proxy disclosure rules
requiring257 disclosure of management projections, banker’s analyses, and deal protections. In
conflict transactions, moreover, Rule 13e-3 requires disclosure of board books and minutes,
giving potential plaintiffs even more pleading fodder. Also, other market players supply
information useful to plaintiffs. Because sale transactions are salient to institutional investors,
255

See Lavin v. West Corp., C.A. No. 2017–0547–JRS, 2017 WL 6728702 at *9 (Del. Ch. 2017) (stating
that the invocation of § 220 to gather books and records before filing a complaint is applicable to a
situation whereby stockholders intend to challenge that a stockholder vote was not informed).
256
Such plenary suits in Delaware had been an unwholesome deal toll that had supposedly been
eliminated or at least sharply curtailed. Regrettably, many of these meritless claims are now filed in the
guise of federal securities claims under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934 and a combination of judicial
action akin to those taken by Chancery and the use of forum selection clauses to eliminate forum
proliferation is needed to redress this rent-seeking at the expense of investors and overall economic
growth. See Alexander Aganin, Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings – 2018 Year in
Review, at 5, https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2018Year-in-Review (M&A federal securities class action filings jumped from 13 in each of 2012-2014 to 198
and 182 in 2017 and 2018, respectively).
257
See supra note 23.
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analysts and proxy advisors produce reports and recommendations on every deal, encouraging
boards to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities and better enabling stockholders to decide how to
vote and whether to sue.
Third, the wave of merger-related § 220 cases creates the oddity that once the challenged
merger occurs the plaintiff typically no longer owns shares in the company from which books
and records are being sought. Plaintiff therefore must rely on its prior status as a stockholder of a
corporation that may no longer exist.
Finally, reliance on § 220 has burgeoned at a time when informal intra-corporate
communications and discussions that in prior generations would likely have been conducted in
person or by phone without a record, are, like all communications now, more likely to involve
emails and texts. This phenomenon exponentially increases the potential grist for the § 220 mill,
including more informal and less guarded communications which are of natural interest to
plaintiffs’ lawyers and of course legitimately discoverable if a plenary complaint survives
dismissal. Despite offering some benefits for plaintiffs, these changes in corporate
communications impose staggering costs on both sides of the litigation.
Understandably, plaintiffs would want statutory “books and records” to include all
documents that would be discoverable in a plenary action. But that inclusion is inconsistent with
the important, yet discrete, function of § 220. The statutory term “books and records” has never
been understood to encompass every piece of paper touching on corporate conduct. Rather, that
term describes the formal documents that a corporation uses to document important action, such
as the minutes of board meetings, resolutions, and contracts. Merely touching on a corporate
decision does not make a document a “book” or “record” within the intended meaning of § 220.
For some time, case law has admonished that the scope of inspection must be guided by a
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standard of precision and limited to core materials necessary to satisfy the stockholder’s proper
purpose. That scope is far narrower than would be available in discovery after a plaintiff pleads a
viable claim.
Unfortunately, practical reality predominates over legal correctness. Companies facing
the potential costs of searching for and producing documents, before a complaint has survived a
motion to dismiss, find it economically more rational to pay attorneys’ fees to cause a meritless
issue to go away rather than expend millions of dollars responding to the § 220 demand or
action. This creates countervailing incentives that are equally unproductive: respondent
companies that choose not to settle or face a non-settling § 220 demander have sometimes put up
a stone wall and made plaintiffs fight for every document.258 This problem is particularly acute in
the case of companies that have not conducted their affairs with typical formality, and therefore
have no meeting minutes, management reports, or advisor presentations that are responsive to a
legitimate § 220 demand.259 Such companies have made “sky is falling” arguments when faced
with a demand to produce the only records they have –emails and texts.260 These “sky is falling”
arguments are regrettably made credible by the propensity of many § 220 petitioners to seek
these informal documents even where traditional formal records are available and have already
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For example, facing what looks identical to pre-filing discovery requests in the guise of a § 220
request, companies have jumped to interject defenses that would be available to them in a plenary action.
For example, in Lavin v. W. Corp., No. 2017-0547-JRS, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 866 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29,
2017), the defendant to a § 220 case argued that books and records should not be produced because an
informed, uncoerced vote of disinterested stockholders had occurred. Chancery rejected this gun jumping
by the defendant, but many corporate defendants feel that Chancery itself has enabled plaintiffs in § 220
cases to gun jump and obtain full-blown discovery not after pleading a viable plenary claim, but in aid of
finding one. Id.; see also AmerisourceBergen, 243 A.3d at 437 (plenary merits defenses typically cannot
be asserted in response to a § 220 complaint).
259
See KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Technologies Inc., 203 A.3d 738 (2019) (plaintiff had to take appeal
to the Supreme Court to receive texts and emails in a situation where more traditional formal materials
that addressed the relevant board behavior and decisions did not exist).
260
Arguments like this were made in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund
IBEW, 95 A.3d 1264, 1272-74 (Del. 2014).
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been produced. This tug and pull of the most unreasonable has exposed companies that do keep
adequate formal books and records to the increased risk that the Court of Chancery will require
them to produce information akin to a full discovery response in a plenary action. In this way,
the entire § 220 regime has become skewed, and disserves both plaintiffs and companies in ways
one cannot imagine was ever intended.
The current reality thus has the virtue of pleasing no one. For the diversified investors of
Delaware companies, it creates more costs than benefits. One possible solution might have been
to apply the standing rules that govern derivative actions, by denying standing to § 220 plaintiffs
who cease to be stockholders.261 A relatively obscure line of cases, however, has held that former
stockholders have standing to seek books and records from their former corporation so long as
the reason for doing so related to the period when they were stockholders and they had a
recognized proper purpose.
In the first such case,262 stockholders of record made a § 220 demand but later lost that
status as a result of a merger in which some of the Class A stockholders, including the plaintiffs,
were cashed out, and the rest (those affiliated with the board) continued as stockholders. The
merger was approved by written consent of the stockholders who would continue after the
merger. Only after the merger was consummated were the plaintiffs in the § 220 action informed
that they would lose their shares. The company argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to seek
books and records after the merger closed. The court held, however, that whether or not the
merger was valid, the plaintiffs had standing because they had sought books and records while
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Two decisions soon after the enactment of § 220 in 1967 side-stepped whether a former stockholder
could seek books and records from the company of which they were previously stockholders to examine
conduct happening before they lost that status, finding that they were not entitled to inspection for other
reasons. See Willard v. Harrworth Corp., 258 A.2d 914, 914-915 (Del. Ch. 1969); Tafel v. IT&T, No.
3149, 1970 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 1970).
262
Cutlip v. CBA Intern., Inc. I, No. 14168 NC, 1995 WL 694422 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1995).
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still stockholders, and § 220 does not contain a continuous ownership requirement like that
imposed by § 327 in derivative suits.
The court adopted this interpretation of standing ten years later,263 in a case where the
plaintiff lost its stockholder status in a merger occurring after the rights offering that the plaintiff
that sought to investigate under § 220. The corporation argued that the merger deprived the
plaintiff of standing, but the court disagreed, holding that the plaintiff “established that it was a
stockholder at the time of its demand and therefore has standing to maintain this action.”264
Another ten years later, after Corwin reaffirmed the traditional principle that an informed
stockholder vote invokes the business judgment rule, plaintiffs’ lawyers seized upon the two
standing cases by routinely submitting § 220 demands before a deal closed – not to stop the deal,
but in search of a basis to plead in a post-closing damages action that the vote was not informed.
Despite the distinct context in Cutlip, which involved a non-public corporation not subject to
SEC disclosure requirements, the Court of Chancery has continued to rule that if a stockholder
made a pre-closing demand and filed its § 220 action before the merger, it had standing to
maintain a post-merger § 220 suit.265
The upshot is that virtually every publicly held Delaware corporation announcing an
M&A transaction now faces demands under § 220, in addition to its duty to present the materials
required by the SEC and Delaware law in connection with the stockholder vote. Companies
often receive multiple § 220 demands and placeholder § 220 suits by plaintiffs who do nothing to
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Deephaven Risk Arb Trading, LTD. v. UnitedGlobalCom, Inc., C.A. No. 379-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
107 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2005).
264
Id. at 27.
265
The requirement to file the § 220 suit before the merger was recognized in Weingarten v. Monster
Worldwide, Inc., No. 12931-VCG, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2017). Although a
restriction on standing, this requirement has in operation simply exposed companies to the need to deal
with placeholder § 220 actions while addressing the time-consuming issues necessary to present and close
a merger.

-80-

seek injunctive relief to stop the deal or to rally other stockholders to vote against it. These suits
proceed on the expectation that the deal will close, and the plaintiffs will be allowed to prospect
for a post-closing claim. The unbroken line of case law and the absence in § 220 of a continuous
ownership requirement akin to that contained in § 327 make it unlikely that this new wave of
rent-seeking can be remedied by a judicial decision holding that a plaintiff that is no longer a
stockholder of the corporation from which it seeks books and records loses its standing to invoke
§ 220.
For these reasons, then, any solution must come from the Delaware General Assembly,
acting upon the recommendation of the Delaware State Bar Association’s Corporation Law
Section Council. To address the problems in the current operation of § 220, the General
Assembly might take more measured action that addresses legitimate concerns of each side of
the “v.” To address “overly aggressive” defenses, § 220 could be amended to give a stockholder
that is not a competitor of the corporation and is willing to enter into a confidentiality agreement
the presumptive right to receive specified materials, such as board and committee minutes,
resolutions, manager and advisor presentations, and corporate contracts, without having to
identify a particular purpose. To assure a fair balance, § 220 could be amended to create a
presumption that materials outside that scope are not essential and need not be produced.
This proposed balance would reduce unreasonable obstruction of § 220 demands, yet
address companies’ legitimate concern that § 220 is being used as a form of full-blown discovery
by plaintiffs who never filed a viable plenary complaint. It would also encourage good corporate
documentation practices, because a failure to act with traditional formality in documenting
important corporate actions would overcome the presumption and allow plaintiffs to receive
materials like texts and informal emails because the statutorily prescribed records are either
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inadequate or nonexistent. This balance would also more efficiently enable the Delaware courts
to satisfy legitimate plaintiffs’ needs without subjecting companies to undue expense and
overreach.266
To deal with the situation where mergers result in termination of stockholder status, the
General Assembly could adopt legislation modeled on the sound reasoning in Polygon Global
Opportunities Master Fund v. W. Corp.267 There, an arbitrage fund sought books and records
under § 220 in aid of seeking appraisal, and bringing a derivative and direct suit,268 but the court
denied inspection under § 220.269 Even though valuing shares to determine whether to seek
appraisal has traditionally been considered a proper purpose for inspection, the court held that
the fund could obtain all “necessary and essential” information for the purpose of valuing its
stock from public filings:270
Polygon seeks additional information beyond that in West Corp.’s
public filings in order to value its stock to determine whether or
not to seek appraisal, yet it has not shown that the information
publicly available in the connection with the transaction omits
information that is necessary, essential and sufficient for its
purpose. There is a dichotomy in § 220 cases between publicly
traded companies and closely held companies. With regard to the
former, public SEC filings typically provide significant amounts of
266

See Palantir, 203 A.3d at 757 (“Ultimately, if a company observes traditional formalities, such as
documenting its actions through board minutes, resolutions, and official letters, it will likely be able to
satisfy a § 220 petitioner’s needs solely by producing those books and records. But if a company instead
decides to conduct formal corporate business largely through informal electronic communications, it cannot
use its own choice of medium to keep shareholders in the dark about the substantive information to which
§ 220 entitles them.”); Woods Trustee of Avery L. Woods Trust v. Sahara Enters., 238 A.3d 879 (Del.
2020) (“The starting point (and often the ending point) for an adequate inspection will be board-level
documents that formally evidence the directors’ deliberations and decisions and comprise the materials that
the directors formally received and considered (the ‘Formal Board Materials.’)”).
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Polygon Glob. Opportunities Master Fund v. W. Corp., C.A. No. 2313-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 179
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2006).
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Id. at *1, *5.
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The court reasoned that the fund lacked standing to bring either kind of contemplated action, having
bought its stock after the conduct giving rise to possible claims arose. The court also held that the fund
had not made a credible showing of possible wrongdoing despite the different form of consideration
received by the controlling stockholders. Id. at *5.
270
Polygon, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 179 at *11.
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information about a company, and decisions granting § 220
demands are narrowly tailored to address specific needs, often in
response to allegations of wrongdoing. In contrast, stockholders in
non-publicly traded companies do not have the wealth of
information provided in SEC filings and are often accorded
broader relief in § 220 actions.
In the case of a going private transaction governed by Rule 13e-3,
the amount of information made publicly available is even more
comprehensive than that required in standard SEC periodic filings.
Through its preliminary and final proxy materials, and its Schedule
13E-3, and amendments, West Corp. would appear to have
disclosed all material information necessary for Polygon to
determine whether or not to seek appraisal. This is not to say that
there is a per se rule that the disclosure requirements under Rule
13e-3 are coextensive with the “necessary, essential and sufficient”
information standard under § 220 demands for valuing stock in the
case of a minority squeeze-out merger. Nevertheless, in the
present case, the detail and scope of West Corp.’s disclosures
makes this so.271
Rejecting the fund’s argument that it should “be given access to the same information it
would receive through discovery in an appraisal action,”272 the court determined that § 220 relief
is categorically different from discovery in a plenary action, including an appraisal case.
Permitting the fund to obtain “additional information beyond the comprehensive disclosure
already in the public domain simply because it could receive such information in a later appraisal
action would be putting the cart before the horse.”273
Amending § 220 in accordance with this reasoning would generally preclude inspection
of a public company’s books and records by a person no longer a stockholder. The SEC and
Delaware common law have combined to require substantial disclosures if a company seeks
stockholder approval of a merger. To entitle stockholders to demand books and records in aid of
showing that those disclosures are somehow incomplete or misleading displaces a well-thought-
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Id. at *16.
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out disclosure regime with a plenary discovery cacophony. That said, the amendment could
allow a former stockholder to maintain a § 220 action, if the stockholder seeks to challenge the
merger in which she gave up her shares, voted all her shares no, did not sell into the merger, and
owned shares before the merger was announced. In that event, however, the plaintiff would only
be entitled to the information required by Rule 13e-3 in conflict transactions to the extent it is in
the company’s possession. If such information were already publicly available, the case would
be dismissed. By this means, Delaware stockholders would have the chance in all mergers on
which a vote is required, to seek the same books and records as Rule 13e-3 requires, even if the
merger is not one involving a conflict transaction to which that rule applies.
Another potential legislative fix would address the issue of companies being whipsawed
by multiple § 220 demands. Amending § 220 to allow a company to consolidate all demands and
require coordination, so that it has to produce only one consistent data set in response to related
demands, would reduce costs of responding to demands often rooted more in jockeying within
the plaintiffs’ bar for positioning in a future plenary action.
By these measured and balanced changes, § 220 would better serve its purpose of
facilitating prompt production of core books and records to stockholders, while reducing the
rent-seeking and cost pressures now imposed on companies by overuse of § 220 in cases where
already public information should presumptively suffice.
V.

Conclusion
In this article we have identified ways to make standards of review more

functional, and to make Delaware’s excellent corporate law in discrete and unrelated
areas even more fair and efficient. We do this in a constructive spirit, and with profound
respect and admiration for the skill, timeliness, and common sense Delaware’s hard-
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working Judiciary brings to bear on the resolution of difficult corporate law cases. Our
goal is simply to suggest in good faith some measured steps to make the world’s best
corporate law fulfill its important role even more effectively. To summarize, our major
recommendations are:
1.

Restrict the Lynch inherent coercion doctrine and the bespoke MFW
solution to it to the domain of going private mergers and tender offers with
controlling stockholders or mergers with another company that the
controller also controls. This will reduce the unhelpful pressures by plaintiffs
to characterize as “controlling stockholders” defendants who have far less than
majority ownership, and unaffiliated defendants as a “situational control bloc.”
Interested transactions would be treated symmetrically and not receive starkly
different treatment simply because of the characterization of the interested party
defendants.

2.

For other self-dealing transactions within the meaning of § 144, restore
symmetry among interested transactions by reaffirming, per traditional
Delaware equity law, that any of the traditional cleansing protections
invokes business judgment review if used with integrity.

3.

Require plaintiffs challenging so-called “non-ratable benefits” to
fiduciaries to prove that the non-ratable benefit resulted from a breach of
fiduciary duty of loyalty and caused specific damage to the company and
other stockholders. If the non-ratable benefit was approved by one of the
traditional cleansing protections, the business judgment rule should apply.
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4.

Apply the second prong of Aronson to provide for demand excusal when
the particularized pled facts support an inference of a non-exculpated
breach of duty by any director — thereby preserving Aronson’s important
integrity-reinforcing role in Delaware law. In any event, harmonize the
deference to decisions by independent directors by according them at least
the same level of respect in the less difficult realm of policing transactions
up front as in determining whether to sue after the fact.

5.

Remove old encrustations on Delaware law that make it unclear and do not
add value:
a.

Eliminate the waste vestige qualifying the effect of an informed,
disinterested stockholder vote.

b.

Formally overrule Cede II’s effort to impose and link layers of
standards of review applicable in disparate contexts.

c.

End Delaware takeover law’s reliance on the concept of substantive
coercion, and hold that Unocal permits a board acting in the
reasonable, good faith belief that a tender offer is too low to use a
pill to block the bid, based on power allocation grounds and not on
the premise that stockholders might harm themselves by ignoring the
board’s contrary view of value.

6.

Amend § 102(b)(7) to allow stockholders to adopt corporate charters exculpating
officers for breaches of the duty of care claims brought by way of a class or
representative action, but not for claims brought directly by the company itself
under a contract or corporate common law.
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7.

Restore balance to the litigation process by amending § 220 to require
prompt production of core books and records, but preclude burdening
companies and investors with what amounts to free ranging and expensive
pre-filing discovery, especially where federal and state law already provide
stockholders with a required and detailed information base on which to base
a vote on, or challenge to, a transaction.

We are mindful how difficult it is for courts to address high-stakes corporate cases
under extreme time pressure, and with dueling arguments from some of the most
persuasive advocates in the nation. Shaping the common law of corporations inevitably
involves policy judgments about the comparative value of investing greater trust in
impartial decision making by directors and stockholders, as opposed to allowing for more
intensive judicial review. There is no cost-free approach, and trade-offs are unavoidable.
But, we continue to believe that the traditional Delaware approach of encouraging
impartial decision-making, but providing companies with flexible means to effect
transactions and conduct their business, remains the optimal one. Diverting from that
philosophical commitment to facilitate judicial review of the substance of more and more
transactions, especially given the vibrancy of stockholder voice, market information
flows, press scrutiny, and tied voting policies that make independent directors highly
responsive to stockholder sentiment, creates more costs than benefits.

Under the

standards we have proposed, stockholders have a fair and effective chance to litigate if
they can faithfully allege that a fiduciary breach has caused real harm. And simplifying
and clarifying Delaware doctrine will enhance the ability of Delaware’s hard-working
and expert courts to do equity that makes not just case-specific, but also systemic, sense.
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